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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5932
The paper explores existing patterns of green innovation 
and presents an overview of green innovation policies 
for developing countries. The key findings from the 
empirical analysis are: (1) frontier green innovations 
are concentrated in high-income countries, few in 
developing countries but growing; (2) the most 
technologically-sophisticated developing countries are 
emerging as significant innovators but limited to a few 
technology fields; (3) there is very little South-South 
collaboration; (4) there is potential for expanding green 
production and trade; and (5) there has been little 
base-of-pyramid green innovation to meet the needs of 
poor consumers, and it is too early to draw conclusions 
about its scalability. To promote green innovation, 
technology and environmental policies work best in 
tandem, focusing on three complementary areas: (1) to 
promote frontier innovation, it is advisable to limit local 
technology-push support to countries with sufficient 
technological capabilities—but there is also a need to 
This paper is a product of the Economic Policy and Debt Department, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management 
Network. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to 
development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://
econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at mdutz@worldbank.org.  
provide global technology-push support for base-of-
pyramid and neglected technologies including through 
a pool of long-term, stable funds supported by demand-
pull mechanisms such as prizes; (2) to promote catch-up 
innovation, it is essential both to facilitate technology 
access and to stimulate technology absorption by firms—
with critical roles played by international trade and 
foreign direct investment, with firm demand spurred by 
public procurement, regulations and standards; and (3) to 
develop absorptive capacity, there is a need to strengthen 
skills and to improve the prevailing business environment 
for innovation—to foster increased experimentation, 
global learning, and talent attraction and retention. There 
is still considerable progress to be made in ranking green 
innovation policies as most appropriate for different 
developing country contexts—based on more impact 
evaluation studies of innovation policies targeted at green 
technologies.GREEN GROWTH, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
More rapid green growth is inconceivable without innovation. Frontier innovations shift out production 
possibilities, allowing the production of more output and newer, more environmentally-friendly outputs 
with fewer or different inputs. Innovations thereby help to decouple growth from natural capital depletion 
and  environmental  pollution,  for  example  towards  more  resource-efficient  and  cleaner  technologies. 
Some innovations can directly increase resilience to environmental shocks. Catch-up innovations, that 
make the use of existing technologies more widespread by adapting them to local contexts, are even more 
important  for  all  countries.  They  typically  reduce  production  costs  and  increase  enterprise 
competitiveness,  and  are  lower  risk  than  frontier  innovations.  The  introduction  of  new  products, 
processes, business models and other organizational methods, and marketing techniques, whether through 
frontier  or  catch-up  innovation,  in  principle  contribute  to  the  expansion  of  existing  markets  and  the 
creation of new markets, in the process increasing the job content and poverty alleviation of growth. 
This paper examines existing patterns of green innovation, to what extent innovation policies should be 
designed differently to address the green growth agenda, and what policy modifications can best help 
yield short-run or at least medium-term impact. The paper discusses the implications of the inherent 
‗double  externality‘  of  knowledge-related  market  failures  compounding  the  traditional  environmental 
externalities. It motivates appropriate policy action in the absence of global agreements, answering the 
question of why developing countries should undertake green innovation policies, and what types of 
policies should be pursued depending on existing technological capabilities. 
In contrast to most recent empirical analyses that use older patent data to 2005 or at most to 2008 to 
characterize international patterns of green frontier innovation (OECD 2011a, Dechezleprêtre et al. 2011, 
Aghion et al. 2011), this paper uses patent data to end-2010 and explores patterns across developing 
countries in greater detail. This matters since there have been significant increases in green patenting over 
the  2006-2010  period.  The  paper  also  examines  different  frontier  innovation  patterns  by  level  of 
technological sophistication of countries, and by extent of cross-country collaboration. As a proxy for 
patterns of broader green catch-up innovation, we analyze data on trade in environmental products. And a 
deeper  analysis  of  trade  data  allows  us  to  explore  the  extent  to  which  developing  countries  export 
products ‗similar‘ to environmental products in terms of required inputs or technologies, as an indicator of 
their  capability  to  start  producing  greener  products.  Finally,  the  paper  also reports  findings  from  an 
exhaustive survey of green Base-of-Pyramid (BoP) innovations to meet the needs of poor consumers. 
In examining appropriate mixes of policies to foster green innovation, the paper combines insights from 
the latest relevant policy literature, available data on policy actions and firm-level responses, and selected 
case studies. These are organized around three complementary policy areas, namely to promote frontier 
innovation, to promote catch-up innovation, and to develop absorptive capacity. The paper makes the case 
for  a  portfolio  of  green  innovation  policies  that  include  policy  instruments  to  address  the  two 
complementary knowledge and environment-related market failures:  both supply-side ‗technology-push‘ 
elements that reduce costs of knowledge creation and adoption  as well as demand-side ‗market-pull‘ 
elements that increase net revenues from sales of greener products. While it is not premature to put a 
green twist on generic innovation policies, for instance that prizes are a preferred policy instrument over 
patents from a number of dimensions to promote the creation and diffusion of green as opposed to non-
green technologies, there is clearly still considerable progress to be made in ranking green innovation 3 
 
policies  as  most  appropriate  for  different  developing  country  contexts.  This  requires  more  impact 
evaluation studies of innovation policies targeted at green technologies. 
The next section explores recent data on existing patterns of green innovation. The third section then 
presents  an  overview  of  green  innovation  policies,  discussing  the  policy  rationale  and  the  range  of 
available instruments. A final section provides summary recommendations. 
 
2  GREEN INNOVATIONS – GROWING FROM A SMALL BASE 
Innovation in the context of development should be defined broadly as the commercialization of new 
ways to solve problems through improvements in technology, with a wide interpretation of technology as 
encompassing product, process, organizational, and marketing improvements. Besides frontier (new-to-
the-world) innovations, this definition includes catch-up innovations, namely the diffusion (both across 
and  within  countries)  and  the  adaptation  to  local  context  of  existing  green  products,  processes, 
organizational and marketing technologies.
2 Green technologies comprise a vast range of fundamentally 
different technologies that support wealth creation and achieve more resource-efficient, clean and resilient 
growth: 
  Regarding  pollution  reduction  and  greater  resource  efficiency,  technologies  include  improved 
recycling and energy efficiency in buildings (thermal insulation and new materials, heating, energy-
efficient lighting), production processes (new uses of waste and other by-products from firms into 
production inputs at the same or other firms), agriculture (from GM crops to mechanical irrigation 
and farming techniques), transport infrastructure, and urban design (including land use). 
  Regarding  climate  change  mitigation,  technologies  include  cleaner  energy  supply  (wind,  solar, 
geothermal,  marine  energy,  biomass,  hydropower,  waste-to-energy,  and  hydrogen  fuels),  end-use 
(electric and hybrid vehicles, climate-friendly cement), and carbon capture and storage (CCS). 
  Regarding  adaptation,  they  include  more  climate-resistant  products and  processes appropriate for 
changing  environments  (such  as  higher  yield  seeds  for  more  arid  and  saline  soils  together  with 
drought-resistant cultivation practices) and tools to understand and insure against climate risks with 
improved early-warning system processes (sea-walls, drainage capacity, reductions in environmental 
burden of disease, and water, forest and biodiversity management). 
  They  also  directly  support  wealth  creation  through  more  sustainable  production  of  plants  and 
livestock,  more  productive  use  of  biodiversity  (natural  cosmetics,  pharmaceutical  products,  eco-
tourism), and ecosystem protection. 
 
 
2.1 Frontier  innovations  concentrated  in  high-income  countries,  few  in  developing 
countries but growing 
There has been a significant worldwide increase in frontier green innovation since the end of the 1990s. 
But most of this is taking place in the high-income countries. Indeed, Japan, Germany and the US account 
for 60 percent of total green innovations worldwide between 2000 and 2005, based on key greenhouse gas 
(GHG)-mitigation technologies. These three countries plus France and the U.K. are the top five ‗high-
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quality‘ inventor countries, accounting for 64 percent of the world‘s total high-quality green inventions. 




Figure 1: Increasing but Small Fraction of All Green Patents 
A.  Number of Green Patents Granted, Developing vs. High Income countries 
 
 
B.  Number  of  Green  Patents  Granted,  by 
Developing Region 
C.  Green Patents Granted as a Percentage of All 
Patent Grants, by Region 
 
 
Total  USPTO  grants  in  OECD  Green  Technology  Areas. 
Source: USPTO patents granted in PATSTAT 
Ratio  of  3-yr  moving  averages  of  USPTO  grants  in  OECD 
Green  Technology  Areas  to  all  USPTO  grants  (%).  Source: 
USPTO grants in PATSTAT 
 
Other than in China, there are few frontier green inventions in the developing world (Figure 1, Panel A).
4 
Over the five year period spanning 2006-2010, countries in the LAC (Latin America and Caribbean), SSA 
(Sub-Saharan Africa) and MENA (Middle East and North Africa) regions were granted a total of 8, 6 and 
3 green US patents, respectively. The EAP (East Asia and Pacific) region, and to a lesser extent S Asia 
(South Asia) and ECA (Europe and Central Asia) regions have a more sizable output, with 49, 17 and 13 
                                                           
3 Based on patent applications in 13 GHG-mitigation technology fields filed in 76 countries, with ‗high-quality‘ 
restricted to patents filed in more than one country (‗claimed priorities‘ rather than ‗singulars‘) by Dechezleprêtre et 
al. 2011. See the data annex for a description of these 13 technology fields, as we use the same OECD categorization 
in our patent analysis. Other options for measuring knowledge creation are discussed in Popp (2011), including 
R&D expenditures as input into the innovation process, scientific publications to measure research at earlier stages 
of technology development than patents, and surveys (which are particularly useful for certain process innovations). 
4 Details of our estimation are given in the annex, including an explanation for why we focus on US patent grants. 


























green patents granted. In comparison, high-income countries were granted nearly 1,500 green patents in 
2010 alone. 
 
Though  small,  the  ‗importance‘  of  green  patenting  as  measured  in  absolute  numbers  in  developing 
regions is rising, particularly in EAP and S Asia. This reflects the general rise in patenting by developing 
countries. Measured by their share in overall patenting per region, green innovations are as prominent in 
ECA and LAC as in high-income countries, having grown relative to all patents; in this relative sense, 
green patents have actually declined since the late 1990s in EAP and S Asia and been stagnant across the 
2000s (Figure 1, Panel C).
 5 But we stress caution in interpreting these trends. For one, these ratios are 
sensitive to even small changes in the number of patents granted to a few countries. Secondly, scale 
matters in R&D: even if the relative importance of green patenting is similar to high-income countries, 
most developing countries have not reached a critical mass of green patenting. 
 
2.2  Technologically-sophisticated  countries  emerging  as  significant  innovators,  but 
limited to a few technologies 
Figure 2: Increasing Patenting in the most Technological Sophisticated Countries 
Number of Green Patents Granted 
 
Total USPTO grants in OECD Green Technology Areas for three periods. Patents granted to high-income 
countries are in 100s. Source: USPTO grants in PATSTAT.  
 
Figure 2 suggests that a significant capacity for frontier green innovation exists in a small group of more 
technologically-sophisticated developing countries. Hence, appropriate green innovation policy is likely 
to differ between these and other developing countries (though given substantial differences among the 
technologically more sophisticated countries, appropriate policy would differ significantly between them 
as well). A group of nine emerging economies (Argentina, Brazil, China, Hungary,  India, Malaysia, 
Mexico, the Russian Federation and South Africa) account for nearly 80 percent of all US green patent 
grants  to  developing  countries  between  2006  and  2010.
 6 Moreover,  unlike  the  technologically  less 
sophisticated countries, these ‗emerging‘ economies display a sharp upward trend in green patenting, with 
their green patent grants more than doubling between 2000-2005 and 2006-2010. 
                                                           
5 We  have  omitted  regions  where  total  green  patenting  is  so  low  that  this  percentage  is  a  highly  volatile, 
uninformative indicator. Moreover, we have taken 3-year moving averages to smooth out annual fluctuations.  
6 We considered indicators of technological sophistication (R& D personnel per capita) as well as the scale of the 



















Figure 3: Increasing Patenting in Specific Technological Fields, varying by Developing Regions 
High Income Countries  EAP 
   
S Asia  ECA 
 
 
Source: USPTO patent grants in green technology areas 
 
Figure 3 highlights that most developing regions ‗cluster‘ in specific green technologies, with the clusters 
varying  by  region.
7 In general, wind, solar and fuel injection for engines are major patenting areas 
common to both  high-income  and developing countries. But the EAP region is specialized in wind, 
lighting, solar, geothermal, ocean  energy  and waste-to-energy  technologies, with no or almost no 
patenting  in  carbon   capture  and  sequestration ,  fuel  injection,  methane   destruction,  biomass  and 
hydropower. Developing countries have also moved into new technology areas in the last decade. For 
example, fuel injection, biomass and cement are now major technology areas for S Asia whereas they had 
no patents in these areas before 2000. Similarly, lighting is a major new area in EAP, and lighting, fuel 
injection and waste-to-energy for ECA. 
 
                                                           








































2.3  Almost no South-South collaboration to-date 
The benefits of green technologies spill across national boundaries, so a higher level of international 
collaboration in green innovation would be the expected norm. But as indicated by the incidence of 
patents with co-inventors from both developing (‗South‘) and high income (‗North‘) countries, the extent 
of North-South collaboration is almost identical for green patents as for all patents, with both having 
increased over time.
 8 Across all technology areas, 42% of patents with an inventor from the South also 
had a co-inventor from the North in 2010 (Figure 4, Panel A). Just for green patents, an almost identical 
43%  had  North  collaborators  (Panel  B). The  corresponding  figures for  1996 were  35%  South-North 
collaborations  across  all  patents,  and  17%  collaborations  for  green  patents.  Interestingly,  these  data 
indicate almost no South-South collaboration: among all green patents granted between 1995 and 2010, 
there is only one instance of South-South collaboration.
9 Thus, there may be scope for policy to increase 
international collaboration in green technologies, particularly  among developing countries. And even if 
the benefits from South-South collaboration on frontier innovations are limited, there is a strong case for 
more collaboration on catch-up innovations when adapted to relatively similar local environments. 
 
Figure 4: Cross-country Collaboration in Patents Granted to Developing Country Inventors 
A.  All Patents  B.  Green Patents 
 
 
Source: USPTO grants in PATSTAT 
 
 
2.4  Potential for expanding green production and trade 
The patent data suggest that there is little capacity for  frontier green innovation in most developing 
countries. However, there could be enormous capacity for catch-up green -up innovation through new-to-
the-firm adoption and adaptation of existing green technologies, and through indigenous base-of-pyramid 
                                                           
8 Guellec  and  Potterie  (2001)  use  patent  co-invention  to  measure  international  collaboration.  Details  of  our 
estimation are given in the data annex. 
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innovation. While these are unlikely to be captured in international patent data,
10 they are reflected in the 
production and trade of ‗green‘ goods and services, to the extent that green technologies are embodied in 
a good or service.
11 
 
As shown in Figure 5, environmental goods constitute a non -trivial and rising share of  high-income 
country exports. The share of green exports is slightly lower in most developing regions  - but the gap is 
nowhere near as large as  with frontier innovations. However, with the exception of EAP , the share of 
green exports has not been rising,  suggesting that new firms are not entering these sectors.
12 The policy 
implication of this observation depends on  the extent  to which this reflects  some under-exploited 
comparative advantages in specific developing countries accounting for lower levels of home production 
and export of green goods and services .    Any policy intervention should be predicated on better 
information on the sources of this under -exploitation, whether driven by specific market or policy 
failures.  For  instance ,  information  on  the  extent  to  which  the  relatively  less  developed  state  of 
environmental regulations in many developing countries may be accounting for these differences  could 
suggest appropriate policies.  
 
Figure 5: Export of Green Goods and Services (as % of all exports)  
 
Source: COMTRADE + OECD List of environmental 6-digit HS categories  
 
Figure 6 shows that green imports are as important (as a share of all imports) in developing regions as 
they  are  in  high-income  countries.  This  indicates  the  international  transfer  of  green  technology  as 
embodied in green consumption goods. Further, inasmuch as some of these  green goods are used as 
inputs, this also indicates the ‗greening‘ of the input mix, which may reflect adoption and adaptation of 
                                                           
10 The lack of good data to measure the diffusion of existing green technologies that lack sufficient global novelty 
for patenting, beyond product-level trade data, is also highlighted by Popp (2011). Dechezleprêtre et al. (2010) use 
green patent applications data to analyze the international diffusion of patented inventions (the number of patents 
invented in Country A and filed in Country B) as an indicator of the number of innovations transferred between 
these countries – an interesting empirical exploration of a small part of diffusion but a poor proxy for broader 
technology diffusion and adaptation across and within countries. 
11 Details of our measurement  of green trade  are given in the data annex.  Note that the underlying technologies 
embedded in these green goods and services are much broader than in the patent discussion, which look only at 
GHG mitigation technologies. These trade-based results are therefore not directly comparable to the patent  results. 
Note also that a n  increase  in  a  country‘s  aggregate  output  of  a  green  product  does  not  necessarily  reflect  an 
innovation since it could be by firms already producing that good. Nonetheless, changes in aggregate green output 
are correlated with the introduction of new-to-the-firm green goods. 













existing technologies by local firms. In addition, the import of green goods may be a response to domestic 
demand-side green policies in developing countries. However, there is no significant upward trend in any 
region in particular. 
 
Figure 6: Imports of Green Goods and Services (as % of all imports)  
 
Source: COMTRADE and OECD List of environmental 6-digit HS categories  
 
Even if developing countries are not increasing their exports of green products, they could be increasingly 
capable of moving into green sectors to the extent that they are producing non-green goods and services 
that enable them to produce green products because of similarities in the required inputs or technologies. 
To examine this broader ‗capability‘ for green exports, we utilize the concept of ‗proximity‘ between 
products.
13 For example, a country with the ability to export apples will probably have most   of the 
conditions suitable to export pears, but not necessarily those for producing electronics. Figure 7 shows in 
general, the trade in green and ‗close-to-green‘ products is about three to five times that in green products 
alone.  Moreover,  some  developing  regions  like  EAP  and  LAC  are  even  comparable  to  high-income 
countries in this respect.  
 
Proximity  between  two  products  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  a  country  producing  one  also  has 
comparative advantage in the other. But as described in Hausmann and Klinger (2007), as countries 
change their export mix –in other words, as comparative advantage evolves– there is a strong tendency to 
move towards proximate goods rather than to goods that are farther away. Thus, Figure 7 suggests that 
some  developing  countries  have  opportunities  comparable  to  developed  countries  to  leap  to  green 
products close to products they already export.  
 
Policies targeting the sources of proximity between products could enable such leaps. The pattern of 
relatedness  of  products  is  only  partially  explained  by  similarity  in  broad  factor  or  technological 
intensities, suggesting that the relevant determinants are much more product-specific, such as product-
specific human capital acquired through learning-by-doing (Hausmann and Klinger, 2007). Therefore, 
any policy intervention should be predicated on better information on the sources of proximity, including 
crucial  technological  differences  and  access  to  complementary  inputs.  Further,  given  the  double 
                                                           
13 Following Hausmann and Klinger (2007), we  measure proximity between  goods by  using an outcome-based 
method which is based on the hypothesis that similar products are more likely to be exported in tandem. Details are 










externality inherent to green innovation, it may be that demand-side policies are also needed to create 
sufficient incentives to make the leap to greener products.  
 
Figure 7: Export of Green + Close-to-Green Goods and Services (as % of 
all exports)  
 
Source: COMTRADE and Proximity Matrix based on 6-digit COMTRADE 
 
 
2.5  Little BoP green innovation to-date 
BoP (Base-of-Pyramid) innovations are defined as innovations to meet the needs of poor consumers. 
They include formal innovations for the poor, namely innovations by global and local private companies 
and  public institutions,  whether  fully  privately  provided,  supported  by  public  subsidies,  or  produced 
through public-private partnerships (such as medicines for neglected diseases and seeds for ‗neglected‘ 
soil types and climates). They also include informal innovations by local grassroots inventors largely 
through  improvisation  and  experimentation.
14 Often facilitated by co -creation with poor consumers 
themselves, the innovations typically seek to better meet the needs of  poor households at dramatically 
lower costs per unit ,  aided by significant scal e-up in volumes  –  hence  they  seek  ―to  create  more 
(products) with less (resources) for more (people)‖.
15 
 
An exhaustive survey of green BoP innovations indicates that very few BoP (and related low-tech) green 
innovations have been sufficiently scaled-up to-date. Whether there may be a need for more focused 
policy efforts in this area requires a better understanding of the constraints, both on the supply and 
demand side, impeding scaled-up commercialization, and the benefit-cost of appropriate policies and their 
implementation  to  improve  market  outcomes.  Box  1  highlights  a  few  representative  green  BoP 
innovations that have been documented. 
 
Box 1. Illustrative BoP innovations 
 
Indoor non-electric cooking stoves: Nearly 3 billion people who don‘t have easy and/or affordable access to some 
form of clean, modern energy use indoor cooking stoves burning biomass crop waste, wood, coal or dung. Smoke 
from the stoves produces black carbon, an important GHG, in addition to indoor air pollution. Patent counts based 
on inventor country highlight the importance of developing countries as developers of such technologies, with China 
                                                           
14 See Utz and Dahlman (2007) for examples of BoP innovations across technologies in India. 











the leading source of patents across all four types of listed stoves. And India is the leading source of scientific 
articles for 3 of the 4 stove technologies, likely driven by research from universities and non-profit foundations, 




Aakash Ganga (‘river from sky’), Rajasthan, India: modernizing an ancient rainwater harvesting system to collect 
safe drinking water is a low-cost adaptation to arid regions, which has won the 2010 Lemelson-MIT award for 
sustainability. It spurred additional innovations and thereby generated a range of efficiency and more inclusive 
growth co-benefits: 
-automating the traditional surveying system with satellite imaging shortens design time, minimizes earthwork and 
reduces material costs 
-a numbering plan for reservoirs facilitates co-investments 
-induced demand for stretchable roofs has spurred more innovation 
-accounting transparency has spurred policy debate on broader inequities in water affordability. 
 
Novel uses of rice husks, one of India’s most common waste products: Husk Power Systems (HPS), winner of the 
2011 Ashden Awards for sustainable energy, has adapted and converted an existing biomass gasification using 
diesel technology into a single fuel rice husk gasifier for rural electrification; households stop using dim kerosene 
lamps  when  they  get  HPS  electricity,  saving  on  kerosene  (with  associated  reductions  in  CO2  emissions)  and 
facilitating  evening  studying/learning  and  other  productive  activities.  Tata  Consulting  Services  US$24  Swach 
(‗clean‘ in Hindi) water filter targeted at rural households with no electricity or running water, using ash from rice 
milling to filter out bacteria, is another example.  
 
Solar irrigation with electric vehicles in Bangladesh: use of lithium-ion batteries (second-hand, recycled from 
electric cars) that are powered by solar panels allow mobile shallow-tube irrigation systems to meet rural farmer 
irrigation  needs  in  Bangladesh  and  other  countries  that  face  limited  electricity  supply  and  make  heavy  use  of 
groundwater. 
 
Source: Popp (2011) on cooking stoves (using a combination of keyword and patent classification searches on the 
Delphion on-line patent database, and using a keyword search of abstracts and titles in the Web of Knowledge 
database); web searches and interviews for others. 
 
Besides BoP innovation, the adaptation of existing technologies to local conditions is a growing area of 
green  innovation  in  developing  countries.  Box  2  provides  some  recent  examples  of  technology 
adaptations by innovative developing country companies that solve limitations of resources, labor and 
infrastructure. They create important co-benefits including more sustainable company cultures. 
Patent and Publication Counts for Indoor Cooking Stoves, to 2010 
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Publications 1990-2010  :                                  
solar  stoves    7     86     12     6     17     9     4     7     0     215   
biomass stoves     40     61     3     7     101    8     7     17     4     319   
LPG stoves    1     26     2     2     18     2     0     2     2     68    
K  erosene /     butane stoves     3     50     2     3     41     4     0     4     1     132   
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Box 2. Local innovation companies show what is possible 
In principle, the home-grown green ideas of innovative local companies to reduce costs, motivate workers and 
shape the business environment they operate in should  make it easier for their peers in comparable developing 
country settings to emulate such approaches. Leading examples include: 
  Equity  Bank  agricultural  financial  products,  Nairobi,  Kenya:  worked  with  mobile  telecoms  provider 
Safaricom to create a mobile banking system on its M-Pesa platform, offering credit for inputs and supporting 
farmers throughout the value chain of production, transport, processing and  marketing; and has formed an 
alliance with groups such as The International Fund for Agricultural Development to reduce its risks when 
lending to smallholders 
  Broad  Group  air  conditions  and  construction,  Changsha,  China:  adapted  non-electric  air  conditioning 
technology from US, Japan, Korea and Europe to use the waste heat from buildings to power its machines, with 
customizable pre-fabricated construction  modules reducing electricity consumption up to 80%, using fewer 
materials and creating less waste; has also developed a miniature device for measuring air pollution that can fit 
into mobile phones 
  Natura  organic  cosmetics,  Sao  Paulo,  Brazil:  worked  transparently  with  rural  communities  and  local 
governments to tap traditional knowledge about how to extract raw materials sustainably (receiving the Forest 
Stewardship Council certificate for these raw materials), in turn educating suppliers in sustainable sourcing and 
production practices (including re-use, refill and recycling of packaging and adoption of a new ‗green‘ plastic 
derived from sugar cane which is eventually expected to reduce GHG emissions by +70%); also gives bonuses 
to workers who find ways to reduced the firm‘s impact on the environment 
  Jain irrigation systems, Jalgaon, India: adapted existing drip irrigation systems specifically to meet the needs 
of smallholder farmers, and works closely with customers to teach ‗precision farming‘ (which optimizes the 
balance between fertilizers, pesticides, water and energy to increase output); and uses dance and song to explain 
the benefits of drip irrigation to farmers who can‘t read 
Source: World Economic Forum (2011). WEF and the Boston Consulting Group partnered to review more than 
1,000 emerging market-based companies with annual sales ranging from $25 million to $5 billion, coupled with 
interviews  of  almost  200  business  executives,  to  identify  16  showcase  companies  in  light  of  sustainability, 
innovation and scalability criteria. 
 
Enterprise surveys are another potential source of systematic information on the extent and breadth of 
such  local  green  innovations.  However,  most  national  industrial  census  efforts  and  complementary 
internationally-comparable enterprise surveys have not yet systematically been collecting information on 
green product, process, organizational and marketing innovations. 
 
3  FOSTERING INNOVATION – POLICIES FOR PROMOTING FRONTIER AND 
CATCH-UP INNOVATIONS AND FOR DEVELOPING ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY 
As with all other technologies, market failures in the creation, dissemination and absorption of knowledge 
by firms provide a rationale for public policies addressing the development and commercialization of 
green technologies. In addition, green technologies are also characterized by environmental externalities. 
The combination of knowledge and environmental market failures require combined policy responses and 13 
 
an even greater emphasis in developing countries on catch-up green innovation relative to developed 
countries.
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There are two gaps between the private and social returns to the production of knowledge that typically 
result in an under-provision of knowledge absent government intervention. The key market failure is the 
partial private appropriability of the returns to investment in knowledge due to the public goods attributes 
of knowledge, in particular that it is non-rivalrous in consumption: once knowledge has been created, it 
can be consumed by all, and indeed it is efficient for it to be used repeatedly by as many as possible, since 
its  consumption  does  not  subtract  from  what  others  know.  This  raises  a  tension  between  static  and 
dynamic efficiency. Although it is most efficient to encourage the use of knowledge as widely as possible 
once it is invented, without sufficiently high pricing and returns there may not be adequate dynamic 
incentives  for  the  required  investment  to  generate  the  knowledge  in  the  first  place.  Since  the  firm 
investing in knowledge creation captures only a portion of the benefits, there will be an under-investment 
in new knowledge, with the extent of under-investment depending on the extent to which the social 
returns exceed private returns, which varies across technologies and applications. Analogously, maverick 
firms adopting an existing technology in a new location (or households for instance adopting solar home 
electricity systems) will typically not fully take into account the positive demonstration spillovers on later 
adopters. In addition, there may be no private investment at all if the up-front R&D costs exceed the 
private ability-to-pay of poorer consumers even though there may be large social returns from the new 
knowledge. 
A second market failure in the creation of knowledge is the information asymmetries between what 
inventors know and what financiers can gauge before the product is commercialized. The inventor has a 
better idea than banks and other potential financial intermediaries of the complexities of the underlying 
technologies  to  be  developed,  and  of  the  ability  and  effort  that  the  inventor  will  devote  to  their 
development. These information asymmetries restrict access to traditional sources of finance and lead to a 
‗funding gap‘ or under-investment in innovation projects that may have a high social return. 
An additional market size externality can create path dependency, affecting the allocation of innovation 
effort and leading to a socially undesirable technology lock-in effect – where lock-in is defined as market 
dominance of an inferior incumbent technology at the expense of a superior contender technology. When 
there  are  two  or  more  technologies  (some  not  even  invented)  that  are  substitutes,  profit-maximizing 
innovators may focus their efforts on improving productivity of existing technologies (―building on the 
shoulders of giants‖) to the extent that the market size for these technologies is large and the return 
higher. The increase in market size when there are economies of scale, compounded by learning and 
network  effects,  can  reinforce  incentives  to  continue  improving  the  quality  of  the  initially-selected 
technology. If this technology is dirty and would lead to an unsustainable growth path, policy intervention 
may be required to re-direct the economy onto a greener growth path. More than other industries, energy 
                                                           
16 This paper focuses explicitly on knowledge-related  market  failures and their interactions  with environmental 
externalities, in contrast to the range of other market failures that motivate green public policy interventions, such as 
coordination externalities and non-knowledge-related public goods. 14 
 
markets are prone to these lock-ins because electricity from different technologies is an almost perfect 
substitute.
17 
Finally –compounding the knowledge-related spillovers and funding gap rationales for policy intervention 
which are common to all types of technologies— there are the traditional environmental externalities 
associated with green technologies. To the extent that the social costs to the environment of technologies 
leading to carbon emissions, other forms of pollution and biodiversity degradation are not reflected in the 
market through prices or non-price policy interventions, firms and households will under-develop and 
under-use greener technologies below socially desirable levels. 
There is no single green bullet to solve both innovation and environmental challenges: countries should 
typically use two sets of instruments to address the two complementary knowledge and environment-
related market failures.  Studies evaluating the effectiveness of policy options find  that a dual set of 
policies involving technology and environmental policies (for instance both research subsidies and carbon 
taxation)  is  superior  to  a  policy  based  only  on  environmental  policies  –  and  that  policy  neutrality 
regarding technology is not always possible and even not desirable in certain cases.
18 Policies addressing 
the knowledge-related market failures can facilitate the creation and diffus ion of new environmentally-
friendly technologies, while complementary policies correcting the environmental externality provide 
stronger incentives for their creation and adoption.  
Based  on  a  two -sector  (initially-dominant  dirty  and  incipient  clean  inputs  representing  substitute 
technologies) growth model of endogenous technical change with environmental constraints, Acemoglu et 
al. (forthcoming) show that the optimal policy includes both  an incentive to stimulate innovation in the 
green sector  (an R&D subsidy directs technical change towards the clean technology)  and a separate 
environmental incentive to internalize the pollution externality (emission taxes or targets). However, they 
also suggest that, under reasonable discount rates and with sufficient substitutability between inputs, it is 
optimal to redirect technical change to the cleaner technology immediately without sacrificing much long-
run growth. On the other hand, a powerful critique  of this model by Hourcade et al. (2011) emphasizes, 
among others: that the need for quite costly regulation is likely to be relatively longer -term, with a large 
negative impact on growth;   that the substitutability between alternate energy sources may be quite 
inelastic in practice, at least in the short to medium te rm, due to the inertia of existing equipments ( the 
capital stock for large sections of the energy system lasts more than 50 years) and to technical constraints 
                                                           
17 See Acemoglu (2002) on directed technical change, and Acemoglu et al. (forthcoming) for an application to green 
innovation. Kalkuhl et al. (2012), using an inter-temporal general equilibrium  model with two competing low-
carbon  electricity  technologies,  show  that  ‗small‘  market  imperfections  may  trigger  a  several-decades  lasting 
dominance of an incumbent energy technology over a dynamically more efficient competitor (that is cheaper in the 
long run). They find that technology quotas and feed-in-tariffs are only insignificantly less efficient than the first-
best technology policy of learning subsidies, in addition to a standard environmental policy (carbon pricing). 
18 That technology and environmental policies work best in tandem is a robust conclusion derived by the three last 
IPCC reports. Del Rio (2008) shows that a combination of a non-neutral technology-prescriptive policy encouraging 
dynamic cost reductions (such as the creation of niche markets for currently -expensive technologies) and an 
incentive-based technology-neutral environmental policy aiming at short -term cost-efficiency (such as tradable 
permits) are needed to address an emissions mitigation objective under conditions of path dependence and lock -in – 
with technology-neutral policies leading to technology choices by the market that may not be cost-effective in the 
long term. Azar and Sanden (2011) argue that policy neutrality regarding technology is often an elusive objective 
that sometimes cannot or should not be prioritized as the main guiding principle. For other contributions, see Popp 
(2010 and 2011). 15 
 
(neither gas nor coal can easily substitute for liquid fuels used in internal combustion engines); and that 
the  model  relies  on  very  restrictive  structural  assumptions  including  a  misrepresentation  of  climate 
irreversibility and an incomplete endogenous growth model. 
Table 1: Innovation policies 
Policy areas  Intended 
beneficiaries 
Policy instruments 
1. Promoting frontier innovation 
(innovation finance and other policies 
for development and commercialization 






- government-funded R&D (public labs; matching grants, soft loans 
and tax credits for private firms)  
- patents and other intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
- support for early-stage technology development (ESTD) finance 
including support for private capital (angels, early stage VC) 
- prizes and Advance Market Commitments (AMCs) 
2. Promoting catch-up innovation 
(policies to facilitate access to new-to-
the-firm knowledge and to stimulate 
technology absorption) 
All firms; 
public labs & 
universities; 
all citizens 
- open trade, FDI, IPRs, diaspora and ICT policies 
- patent buyouts and compulsory licenses 
- patent pools and open source mechanisms 
- public procurement, standards and regulations 
- support for finance to early adopters/demonstrations 
3. Developing absorptive capacity 
(policies to strengthen skills and more 
broadly spur the accumulation of new 
knowledge by entrepreneurs/firms) 





- education and life-long learning policies 
- enterprise-based worker training, management and entrepreneurship 
training, and other technical and vocational education and training 
(TVET) 
- facilitating connectivity through global alliances and supplier 
development linkages to global value chains 
- rule of law, contract enforcement, competition, bankruptcy & re-entry 
facilitation; urban policies (‗sticky‘ cities to attract and retain talent) 
Note: While some policy instruments like public procurement, standards and regulation are relevant for all three policy areas, they are 
listed in the area deemed most important to stimulate green innovation in most developing countries. 
The following sections discuss in turn policies to support new knowledge creation, to strengthen diffusion 
and adaptation of existing knowledge to local contexts, and to develop absorptive capacity for innovation, 
as  outlined  in  Table  1.  Beyond  the  robust  desirability  of  two  sets  of  instruments  to  address  the 
complementary knowledge and environment-related market failures, what distinguishes green innovation 
policies as opposed to generic (non-green) innovation policies? While there are still insufficient impact 
evaluation studies of green innovation policies, both in general and as applied to different developing 
country contexts, it is not premature to put a green twist on the innovation policies listed in Table 1 by 
prioritizing  certain  policy  instruments  over  others  based  on  defining  characteristics  of  most  green 
technologies. One key characteristic of most green technologies is that their broad diffusion and adoption 
is even more socially desirable than for non-green technologies, given the environmental externality. 
Another  key  characteristic  is  that  the  efficient  use  of  green  technologies  requires  them  to  be  more 
heterogeneous than non-green technologies, given the significant variance of the underlying environment 
by locality (while a state-of-the-art computer chip will be the same whether used in Mexico or Thailand, 
green technologies require adaptation to local soil, water, air, wind and sun conditions, among others). So 
prizes, for instance, are typically a preferred policy instrument over patents to promote the creation and 
diffusion of green as opposed to generic technologies, as patents tend to inhibit both diffusion and the 
follow-on innovation that builds on the protected technologies, while prize funds can be targeted to meet 
well-defined objectives, with the developed knowledge widely disseminated and used by all once the 
prize  is  awarded.  While  Advance  Market  Commitments  are  a  useful  complementary  demand-pull 
mechanism to prizes, they are still premature in most countries as there are not yet  well-functioning 16 
 
markets for the development of many green technologies that don‘t require government support in the 
first place. 
 
The  green  innovation  policy  agenda  needs  to  be  tailored  to  countries  depending  on  their  local 
environmental  needs,  technological  sophistication  and  implementation  capabilities.  The  latter  is 
important, as systemic institutional government failures (including uncoordinated and conflicting policies, 
unclear responsibilities, and ineffective implementation with excessive rent-seeking) need to be addressed 
if  activist  policies  to  address  market  failures  are  to  lead  to  better  outcomes  than  no  intervention. 
Policymakers need to better understand local environmental needs and the innovation ecosystem in their 
countries, for both firms at the technological frontier and behind it, designing policies that make the 
ecosystem work better and applying resources at the most appropriate places. They then need to put in 
place the public-private dialogue processes and capabilities to prioritize and implement policies, and the 
monitoring and evaluation systems so policies can be continually improved for more effective impact. 
 
3.1 Promoting frontier innovation – different approaches depending on local technological 
sophistication 
A portfolio of policies for frontier innovation can generally be thought of as having both supply-side 
‗technology-push‘ elements that reduce costs of knowledge creation in advance of commercialization, and 
demand-side  ‗market-pull‘  elements  that  enhance  net  revenue  from  sales  after  commercialization. 
Stimulating appropriate innovations will likely require use of multiple incentives that affect investments 
on both cost and revenue margins. 
 
New  frontier  technologies  can  be  created  and  commercialized  even  in  countries  where  average 
technological capabilities are relatively less sophisticated, provided there are one or more agglomerations 
of firms with sufficient technological capabilities, ideally supported by sufficiently high-quality higher 
education systems – provided the benefit-cost of public support is sufficiently high to warrant expenditure 
of scarce public resources relative to alternative uses. This can be achieved by taking advantage of the 
heterogeneity of public and private capabilities, with the participation in public-private dialogue processes 
of better-performing firms and parts of the public sector in whatever sector and urban/rural setting they 
are located within countries.
19 
 
3.1.1 Limit local technology-push support to countries with sufficient technological capabilities 
 
Direct government funding for R&D is an important element of many innovation systems, including 
funding of public labs and universities, as well as grants, matching grants, soft loans, and R&D tax 
subsidies to private firms for early-stage, pre-commercialization technology development (for individual 
firms,  and  for  collaborations  between  firms,  and  between  firms  and  public  labs/universities). 
Government-funded  R&D  of  public  R&D  institutes  is  the  traditional  supply-push  mechanism,  with 
selection of whom to engage in research projects bureaucratically rather than market-determined, ideally 
                                                           
19 See Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2005) on growth accelerations. And see Rodrik (2007) on broader policy 
lessons  from  these  growth  acceleration  episodes,  including  the  need  for  context-specificity  and  prioritization, 
sequencing and targeting of reforms on the most binding constraints through a structured process of public-private 
dialogue. 17 
 
through  a  group  of  independent  peers  (when  the  research-awarding  process  is  not  captured  by  rent 
seekers). One advantage of this approach is that it allows coordination of research efforts with little or no 
excess  duplication.  With  respect  to  dissemination,  publicly-produced  knowledge  should  generally  be 
made  freely  available,  which  is  socially  desirable  to  ensure  efficient  use  once  produced.  A  key 
shortcoming of government-funded R&D is that, as research moves from basic to more applied phases, 
incentives are not strong to reflect information from markets about what consumers want and are willing 
to pay for. 
 
As highlighted in Section 1, frontier green (and non-green) innovations that are dependent on significant 
formal R&D support have to-date largely been concentrated in high-income countries and a few more 
technologically  advanced  developing  countries,  with  most  developing  countries  having  little  such 
innovations as indicated by patent data. So there is likely a more limited role for formal R&D support for 
frontier innovations in most developing countries, to the extent that such spending reflects underlying 
technological capabilities.
20 Box 3 illustrates one such area, the development of smart grids, where major 
direct government funding for R&D, typically in public-private partnership mode, is taking place in many 
more technologically-advanced countries, and where the benefits are expected to eventually be reaped by 
all countries as these technologies diffuse and are absorbed by a broader range of firms. 
 
Box 3. Smart grid R&D and expected green benefits 
  ‗Smart grid‘ means computerizing the electric utility grid, similar to the way today‘s ‗smart phones‘ have a 
computer inside. It includes adding two-way digital communication technology to all devices associated with the 
grid to ensure two-way flow of electricity and information between all power plants and consumers and all points in 
between, with sensors to gather data on incoming power from wind, solar and other renewable that have constantly 
varying  power  outputs,  broken  equipment  and  leakages,  more  intelligent  management  of  generation  outages, 
integration of electric vehicles, and power meter usage in homes and offices. R&D activities advance smart grid 
functionality by developing next-generation technologies and tools in the areas of transmission, distribution, energy 
storage, power electronics, cyber-security, and the advancement of precise time-synchronized measures of certain 
parameters of the grid.  
  A recent study on whether the smart grid is expected to reduce the intensity of green-house gas emissions 
in the US concluded that it will likely slow the growth in electric power production by reducing consumption over 
what  would  have  otherwise  been  consumed  without  the  smart  grid,  noting  that  history  has  shown  that  new 
appliances are typically added to homes as they become available, as the population grows, and as incomes and 
affordability  rise.  It  emphasized  benefits  of  energy  conservation  by  consumers  facilitated  by  demand-response 
programs  and  demand-side  management,  improvements  in  transmission  and  distribution  systems  that  optimize 
power consumption and reduce the need for electric power, as well as the benefits from electricity storage and 
management,  allowing  utilities  to  smooth  renewable  generation  and  use  base-load  generation  sources  more 
effectively. 
Source: NETL (2011) and http://energy.gov/oe/technology-development/smart-grid 
 
                                                           
20 However,  even  in  less  developed  countries,  extending  and  adapting  existing  global  technologies  to  local 
characteristics may justify some investment in basic R&D, including to build technological capacities to define 
national  standards  –  for  instance,  solar  power  technology  typically  needs  to  be  adjusted  to  local  climate  and 
meteorological conditions, and quality standards for solar panels need to be defined. Public subsidies for basic R&D 
are subject to the general implementation challenges of focus (which projects to focus on), design (how much 
subsidy and how best to allocate), and governance structures to mitigate rent-seeking. 18 
 
Figure 8 presents data on the absolute central government budget appropriations or outlays for R&D for 
environmental technologies and for clean energy technologies (a subset of environmental technologies) 
for 33 countries including 8 developing countries (on the right-hand side, in millions of US$ in PPP 
terms). The fact that no developing country is in the top 10 absolute funders of energy and environment 
R&D reflects data availability (China, for instance, is not included presumably due to data comparability 
issues), but is also consistent with the more limited technological capabilities for formal R&D in most 
developing  countries;  the  only  developing  countries  included  among  the  top  20  funders  for  which 




Figure 8. Government R&D budgets for energy and the environment, 2010 
A.  As a percentage of the total government R&D 
budget 
B.  Total budget on Environment + Energy, 
Millions USD PPP 
   
Source: OECD, Research and Development Database, May 2011.  Note: Government budget appropriations or 
outlays for R&D measures the funds committed by the federal/central government for R&D. It can be broken 
down by various socio-economic objectives, defined on the basis of the primary purpose of the funder, including 
control and care for the environment as well as energy. 
 
   
                                                           
21 To the extent that the figures in Box 4 are comparable, Brazil with green R&D expenditures of $300 million 








































































Figure 8 also presents data on publicly-funded research priorities to achieve energy and environment 
objectives as part of their overall central government R&D budgets. Of available developing countries, 
Mexico allocates the greatest share of its total R&D budget to environmental technologies, at slightly over 
10 percent, with most expenditures in areas other than clean energy technologies. At the other end, the 
Russian Federation provides the least relative support of available developing countries, with 2% of its 
R&D budget on environmental technologies. It is noteworthy that other available ECA countries are not 
at  the  bottom  of  the  table,  with  Estonia,  Czech  Republic,  Slovenia,  Poland,  Slovakia,  Belarus  and 
Hungary all devoting a higher share of their R&D budget to energy and the environment than the US and 
Russia. Box 4 provides a more detailed breakdown of green R&D expenditures in Brazil in 2010, making 
the case that Brazil‘s levels of expenditures relative to total R&D are not in line with the comparative 
advantage of its natural capital, constraining an otherwise more rapid national green growth. 
 
Box 4: Brazil‟s green R&D expenditures – more than government budget, more than renewable energy 
Comparable data to Figure 8 highlight that Brazil‘s government green R&D budget in 2010 was U$300 
million out of a total government R&D budget of $15.8 billion, or 1.9%, placing Brazil in percentage terms at the 
bottom of the table, below US and Russia and only slightly above Israel. However, government outlays on R&D 
were only 42% of total green R&D expenditures in 2010, with business outlays (split 56% versus 44% across private 
and state-owned businesses) accounting for the remaining 58% of total green R&D expenditures of $716 million 
(which account for 2.6% of total R&D expenditures, in turn accounting for 1.2% of GDP in 2009). 
  The allocation of total green R&D expenditures is 45% towards renewable energy and 55% towards other 
environmental  areas,  with  a  breakdown  of  the  latter  into  productive  uses  of  biodiversity  and  protection  of 
ecosystems (32% of total green R&D expenditures) and ‗greener agriculture‘ (23%). A further disaggregation of 
R&D expenditures across these three areas reflects underlying comparative advantages, namely: (1) for renewable 
energy, biofuels account for 82% of the total, with hydro and biomass accounting for a further 6.4 and 4.4%; (2) for 
biodiversity and ecosystems, natural cosmetics account for 36% of the total, with atmospheric ecosystem protection, 
sustainable resource extraction and energy efficiency accounting for a further 21.2, 9.5 and 6.9%; (3) for greener 
agriculture, sustainability of agricultural production and biotechnology account for 30 and 27% of the total, with 
agricultural zoning and integration of productive value chains accounting for a further 9.0 and 7.8%. But although 
these  expenditures  on  R&D  have  yielded  impressive  research  outputs,  the  link  between  research  outputs  and 
commercializable patents remains weak: while Brazil leads in sugarcane research with 300 scientific articles on 
Thomson Reuters‘ ISI Web of Science (with the US almost three times fewer and China at 30 in 2008), China and 
the US lead Brazil in accumulated sugarcane patents with the EPO over the 2006-2010 period, with 175 for China, 
18 for the US, and only 5 for Brazil. 
  Frischtak claims that these levels of expenditures in R&D and patent results are in stark contrast with the 
diversity, scale and potential of natural assets available in Brazil. What is needed, according to Frischtak, is a 
national consensus around the establishment of a clear strategy and work program that finances and creates broader 
science  and  technological  and  regulatory  capabilities  in  Brazil  aimed  at  better  stimulating  R&D  and  frontier 
innovation towards a pattern of growth driven by the sustainable productive use of these green assets. The detailed 
breakdown of green R&D expenditures data is an essential input into the debate towards achieving such a national 
consensus. 
Source: Frischtak (2011), and an average 2010 exchange rate of 1.76 Reals to the US dollar (IFS, IMF). 
 
In  contrast  to  the  supply-push  of  government  R&D  funding,  patents  were  initially  devised  as  a 
decentralized demand-pull self-selection mechanism, allowing those who believe they are the most likely 
to succeed to risk their own resources for the ‗prize‘ of a period of exclusivity during which they can set 
product prices, with the quid pro quo of full disclosure of the knowledge to other researchers. In practice, 
significant public funding of R&D, both to public and private entities, typically accompanies the own-20 
 
resources of the researchers toward the development of patentable ideas. Patents can serve a useful signal 
for private finance. However, well-known problems with the patent system are that it is distortionary and 
inequitable in the way funds to support further research are raised, namely by charging monopoly prices, 
and  inefficient  in  the  way  usage  of  new  knowledge  is  restricted.  Researchers  also  face  significant 
litigation risk. Moreover, although innovation incentives are strong in the patent system, they are distorted 
because there  are incentives  to  engage  in research to  innovate  around  existing  patents  and  to  spend 
resources in ways that extend the life of patents. There are also other market distortions such as the 
largely socially-dissipative advertising and marketing expenditures designed to reduce the elasticity of 
product market demand in order to raise prices and profits.
22 
 
Once new commercializable ideas have progressed to the proof of concept stage that demonstrates their 
feasibility, whether or not protected by one or more patents, further early-stage technology development 
(ESTD)  finance  is  required.  The  range  of  ESTD  finance  options  includes  both  public  and  private 
resources,  with  private  sources  at  this  early  stage  typically  restricted  to  friends  and  family,  angels 
(affluent individuals, often retired successful entrepreneurs, providing start-up capital and mentoring), 
venture capital (VC), private equity firms (at later stages),  and private corporations (who fund ideas 
developed in-house and acquire young start-up companies);
23 cheaper sources of financing, such as bank 
finance, are usually not available for most early-stage ventures as they are too small or young to qualify 
for traditional loans. Angels and VC investors make money through successful exits based on a sufficient 
deal flow, with the typical liquidity event being  an acquisition or an initial public offering (IPO) on a 
local or international stock market. If the IPO market is weak with not enough companies going public, 
then the VC business model is threatened. The challenge facing most developing countries in this area is 
that these capital market-based, arms-length forms of finance that structure and price each transaction on 
its merits require deep financial markets underpinned by demanding institutional legal and regulatory 
frameworks, with monitoring and enforcement mechan isms relying on extensive formal disclosure and 
corporate governance standards. This is not an area where public interventions such as jump -starting a 
new VC industry have been successful on average  –  which  is  why  the  recommendation  for  most 
governments is that they should focus on ―setting the table‖ rather than ―cooking the meal‖ by ensuring 
that the basic underpinnings are in place of rule of law, contract enforcement, and broad certainty in legal 




                                                           
22 See Stiglitz (2008) and Henry and Stiglitz (2010) on the desirability of re-designing the prevailing patent regime 
to increase its benefits and reduce its costs, and to combine it with government-funded research, prizes and other 
mechanisms as part of a portfolio of complementary innovation-support instruments. In their review of the relevant 
literature, Hall and Helmers (2010) also conclude that, given the environmental externality, patents may not be the 
ideal and cannot be the only policy instrument to encourage green innovation – in light of their tendency to inhibit 
both diffusion and the follow-on innovation that builds on the protected technologies. 
23 In 2010 in the US, angel investment accounted for almost as much money invested as all VC funds combined 
($20.1 billion vs $23.3   billion), but they touched more than 60 times as many companies (61,900 vs 1,012 
companies), more than 10% of the roughly 600,000 businesses founded in the US each year, with over 370,000 jobs 
attributed to angels, widespread across sectors (healthcare, m edical devices, biotech, industrial/energy, software, 
retail, IT services, including green applications). And big private sector corporate like Petrobras (Brazil), ZTE 
(China), Siemens (Germany), Tata (India), and IBM (US) have set up sizable green tech business lines. See Chatterji 
(2011). 21 
 
Box 5: “Pinstripe greens” – Private financiers making millions from clean tech ventures 
Although global VC investment in green energy declined with the 2008-09 recession, and shares in clean-
tech businesses have underperformed the wider market by a large margin recently, a world of US solar titans, 
German wind moguls, Brazilian bio-fuel magnates and Chinese battery tycoons has emerged over the past decade. 
One often hears that ―green energy could be the biggest economic opportunity of the 21st century‖. In 2010, the 
global clean energy sector (wind farms, solar parks and related technologies) attracted a record $243 billion in new 
investment, nearly 5 times the volumes six years earlier. And between 2000 and 2010, the global market for solar 
and wind power rose from $6.5 to $132 billion, the number of hybrid electric car models jumped from 2 to 30, and 
the number of certified green buildings grew from 3 to 8,138. Examples of private green financing include: 
  Khosla Ventures: a venture capital firm founded by Vinod Khosla in 2004 with a clean tech portfolio spanning 
utility-scale  and  distributed  generation,  electrical  and  mechanical  efficiency,  batteries,  building  materials, 
plastics and chemicals, agriculture, cellulosic alcohol and advanced hydrocarbons, and including investments in 
a low-emission engine (with Bill Gates) and two-bladed wind turbines (with Goldman Sachs) 
  Bloomberg  New  Energy  Finance:  a  provider  of  analysis,  data  and  news  about  clean  tech,  including  on 
renewable  energy,  energy  smart  technologies,  carbon,  carbon  capture  and  storage,  renewable  energy 
certificates, nuclear, power markets and water; founded by Michael Liebreich in 2004 and generating over $1 
billion in profits in the last 12 months 
  Suntech: Chinese company  founded in 2001 by Dr  Zhengrong Shi and floated on the NYSE in 2005; the 
world‘s largest producer of solar panels, with solar modules installed in over 80 countries (and a low-carbon 
museum in Wuxi, west of Shanghai, opened by Al Gore) 
Source: ―How green were their ventures‖, Financial Times, November 5, 2011. 
 
3.1.2 Provide global technology-push support for BoP and neglected technologies 
 
It is not advisable for countries with low technological capabilities and no comparative advantages in 
creating frontier technologies to be dedicating significant public resources to this objective within their 
own country. However, given the global nature of the benefits from green innovation, stable, long-term 
global public spending on R&D needs to increase and be channeled into programs that facilitate the 
development and adoption of technologies applicable to developing country contexts. 
 
Prize funds are one relevant demand-pull mechanism to promote technologies at the global level for the 
needs of countries with lower technological capabilities, and for BoP and neglected needs. Typically, a 
pre-announced prize is given to whoever comes up with an innovation that meets defined objectives. Prize 
funds are most appropriate when objectives can be well defined but the technologies are unknown. The 
researcher only gets the guaranteed return, in principle more than sufficient to cover time and other 
resources spent, if the research is successful before that of rivals. Prizes can be designed to be paid out 
only  when  specific  outcomes  are  delivered.  The  size  of  the  prize  and  the  number  of  prizes  can  be 
calibrated by the novelty and magnitude of contribution of the innovation. Like patents which are a form 
of prize, these more generic prizes are decentralized and based on self-selection. However, once the prize 
is awarded, developed knowledge can be made freely available, widely disseminated and used by all.
24 A 
proportional prize makes rewards proportional to the measured impact of any successful inn ovation, 
providing incentives to public and private sectors to generate evidence on the results of innovations, 
measured for instance by  the degree of adoption and productivity improvement  – though auditing and 
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verification  costs  can  be  relatively  high.
25 Ideally, the award process  should  require revelation of 
information on the innovation  so  that  it  can then be broadly disseminated. Such prize funds are 
particularly relevant for promoting more radical green innovations that are likely to be fostered not 
through the traditional linear R&D approach but rather through out-of-the-box new knowledge involving 
co-creation and co-design by scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs, producers and users from different 
disciplines. Box 6 presents a few of the green prizes that have been set up over the past years. 
 
Box 6. On prizes that seek to stimulate new solutions to green development challenges 
Discussion of key lessons to-date of competitions such as: 
  Ashden Awards for Sustainable Energy: annual awards set up in 2001 (linked to the UK Sainsbury Family 
Charitable Trusts) to reward local sustainable energy projects in the UK and in developing countries (including 
innovators at the household and local community levels), with currently a top prize of £ 40k and six prizes of £ 
20k  for  developing  countries,  plus  a  broadcast-quality  film  about  their  work  and  a  substantial  post-award 
business support package 
  i6 Green Challenge: a new regionally-driven $12 million competition by the US Department of Commerce in 
partnership with the National Institutes of Health and National Science Foundation (run in 2010, it supported 
best ideas for green technology commercialization in six different regions of the US) 
  Virgin  Earth  Challenge: a  $25 million prize launched in February 2007 by  Virgin  boss Richard Branson 
alongside former US VP Al Gore for an approach ―to remove at least one billion tons of carbon per year from 
the atmosphere‖; not yet claimed, highlighting that climate solutions can be both hard to find and verify 
  Australia  Climate  Ready:  support  for  SMEs  to  develop  green  technologies  through  R&D  and/or  proof  of 
concept and/or early-stage commercialization; features a hybrid policy design associating both prize awards and 
funding as an efficient way to stimulate innovation in the area of climate change 
 
Advance Market Commitments (AMCs) are another demand-pull mechanism complementary to prizes. 
AMCs are most appropriate when key characteristics of the desired technology are known and can be 
specified in a contract. With AMCs or purchase guarantees, sponsoring international financial institutions, 
governments  and/or  private  foundations  make  a  legally-binding  contractual  commitment  at  a  pre-
specified price to purchase a given quantity of a qualifying product when that product becomes available 
on the market, without any winner-take-all requirement. According to a proposal by Barder, Kremer and 
Williams (2006), the AMC could be split; for example, a low-income country could commit some part of 
the purchase price and donors could make up the difference. The contracts may also include provisions 
requiring manufacturers to license their technology after the agreed-upon quantity had been purchased, or 
to sell further units at low prices. 
 
In the first real-world pilot of this mechanism, a group of governments and private foundations in 2007 
committed $1.5 billion for a Pneumococcal AMC. The pneumococcal vaccine was chosen because it has 
a large health impact, suitable vaccines for developing countries are already in development, and the 
AMC can speed the products to market.
26 Although AMCs have so far been applied to provide affordable 
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access  to  healthcare in  low-income  countries,  the  approach  could  be  applied in  a  similar  manner  to 
stimulate  innovations  and  widespread  access  to  more  affordable  green  solutions,  such  as  a  nutrient-
fortified staple food crop or an improved storage technology in contexts of land and water scarcity, 
climate change, and declining crop yields.
27 
 
More generally, a strong case exists for a pool of long-term, stable funds for basic research on important 
frontier green innovation areas for developing countries, whether allocated through prizes, AMCs or other 
mechanisms.
28 Issues to be addressed include: 
  most effective modalities for global research efforts on important topics for developing countries, 
including total amount of required global resources and resource allocation by areas of need and by 
geography (including best forms of engagement of R&D networks in developing countries), and how 
best to capture demand on what is most important to ensure the research is user-relevant; 
  lessons from experience with encouraging development of more general purpose technologies (GPTs) 
such as ICT, materials, nanotech and biotech rather than spending on specific green policy areas, and 
on stimulating convergence across GPTs;  
  the experience with institutional protections to avoid delivering subsidies to favored firms, industries 
and other organized interests – such as multi-year appropriations, agency independence in making 
grants, use of peer review with clear criteria for project selection, and payments based on progress 
and outputs rather than cost recovery;  
  the  extent  of  IFI  coordination  and  assistance,  given  that  direct support  puts greater  demands  on 
government capabilities, which are typically weaker in developing countries. 
 
Box 7. Lessons from ARPA-E, an example of US frontier innovation support that could provide a model for a 
global green innovation pool 
  US Department of Energy‘s new Advanced Research Project Agency-Energy, authorized by the US Congress in 
2007  with  an  initial  funding  of  $400  million  in  2009,  is  intended  to  support  early  stage  radical  energy 
technologies that are too high risk for private investors to adequately fund, modeled on DARPA (the central 
R&D organization for the US Department of Defense established in 1958 and responsible for technological 
breakthroughs such as stealth aircraft in the 1970s, unmanned aerial drones in the 1980s, and the Internet) 
  Key elements of ARPA-E (and DARPA‘s) management strategy are to invest its funds at external organizations 
(with opportunities for rebuttal to reviewers‘ comments prior to funding decisions), primarily universities and 
industry, bringing in entrepreneurial program managers empowered to make quick decisions about starting, 
continuing or stopping research; and funding a variety of competing technologies while leaving the private 
sector to pick winners 
 
3.2 Promoting catch-up innovation – facilitating technology access and stimulating 
technology absorption 
Promotion of green growth for most developing countries is typically more about catch-up innovation and 
the diffusion of already-existing technologies than about frontier innovation. For all countries, the cost of 
not adopting, adapting and using existing green technologies can be high in terms of foregone greener 
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AMCs may be useful, and issues involved in choosing a pilot AMC. 
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development. Consequently, facilitating access to environmentally-friendly technologies and stimulating 
their uptake are essential parts of an effective green growth strategy.
29 In most developing countries, there 
is significant scope for policy to remove existing distortions and address weaknesses in the  business 
environment that impede private innovation, in particular adaptation and dissemination of technologies 
from more advanced countries and w ithin developing countries from urban to rural areas, as well as 
strengthening the absorptive capacity of the domestic economy. Such policy efforts can cover a broad 
range,  including  adopting  more  open  foreign  trade,  investment  and  technology  licensing  reg imes, 
strengthening the country‘s metrology, testing and quality (MSTQ) facilities to support upgrading toward 
more energy-efficient technologies, improving the quality of and access to mobile phones, Internet and 
other communications networks, reducing domestic barriers to firm entry and exit, improving access to 
finance, strengthening skills and capacity development, and implementing more demand-side policies 
such as public procurement, regulations and standards. The section begins by surveying key policies to 
facilitate access to existing technologies, then discusses the critical set of supporting policies to stimulate 
their uptake, and concludes with a discussion of the relative effectiveness of supply-push versus demand-
pull policies. 
3.2.1 Facilitate access to green technologies 
Openness to international trade and FDI are among the key factors correlated with adoption rates for 
technology. Many green technologies are embodied in imported capital goods, machinery and equipment; 
some are knowledge-based processes or business models and diffuse via movements of people attached to 
MNCs (multinational corporations) or from the diaspora; and some can be copied by studying imported 
final goods, or by studying patents (when elapsed) or inventing around them (when still effective). There 
is evidence that tariffs on renewable energy technologies and subsidies for fossil fuels do more to limit 
technology transfer of clean technologies than patent protection.
30 A recent study finds that eliminating 
tariff and non-tariff barriers in the top 18 developing countries ranked by GHG emissions would increase 
imports by 63 percent for energy-efficient lighting, 23 percent for wind power generation, 14 percent for 
solar power generation, and 4.6 percent for clean coal technology.
31 In a study of electric power plants in 
India, Khanna and  Zilberman (2001) find that removing import barriers to higher -quality coal would 
increase the adoption of more energy-efficient technology and potentially decrease carbon emissions. 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol is an explicit mechanism to boost 
technology  transfer  and  diffusion,  as  it  allows  high-income  countries  to  develop  or  finance  GHG 
emissions  reduction  projects  in  developing  countries  in  exchange  for  emission  reduction  credits. 
However, high-income country investments tend to be small when compared to FDI. Based on an analysis 
of GHG mitigation technology transfers, Dechezleprêtre et al. (2008) show that international transfers 
have taken place in less than half of the CDM projects, typically combining transfer of equipment with 
knowledge and operating skills. They also find that most technology transfers concerned end-of-pipe 
destruction of GHGs in chemical, agricultural and waste management industries (highly specialized, with 
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adaptive R&D required to fit the technology to local markets. 
30 See Copenhagen Economics (2009) and Barton (2007) as cited by Hall and Helmers (2010). 
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very  little  spillover  to  greening  in  the  broader  economy),  and  wind  power.  Other  projects  such  as 
electricity production from biomass or energy-efficiency measures in manufacturing mainly rely on local 
technologies.
32 In principle, there is an ambiguous relationship between local absorptive capacity  and 
international technology transfer: while high technological capabilities may be required to adopt new 
technologies, high capabilities also could imply that many technologies are already available locally 
thereby reducing the likelihood of international transfer. They find that the first effect strongly dominates 
in the energy and chemical industries, while the second effect dominates for agricultural projects 
(suggesting that agricultural technologies transferred tend to be simpler). Their findings (200 8, 2009) 
highlight the importance of local capacity building as a means to accelerate technology diffusion – with a 
strong push by local/municipal governments to strengthen technology capabilities facilitating both the 
importation of foreign technology and the local diffusion of domestic technologies. 
Additional  mechanisms  to  foster  increased  access  to  existing  technologies  include  patent  buy-outs, 
compulsory licenses, patent pools and open source approaches. A patent buy-out, as outlined by Kremer 
(1998), is a mechanism to increase access to existing products, or to future products that already benefit 
from adequate innovation incentives. The idea behind patent buy-outs is that a purchaser –for instance, an 
international financial institution, government or private foundation– acquires exclusive marketing rights 
for a patented global green product from the patent owner and offers a non-exclusive, no royalty license 
to any legitimate generic manufacturer to sell the product in certain target developing country markets. 
The  patent  owner  is  compensated  under  a  buy-out  formula.  Generic  pricing  through  multiple 
manufacturers prevails in the target developing countries. Regular patent-based pricing remains in all 
other countries. The key problems with buy-outs are the development of a mechanism to determine the 
buy-out price and the availability of a purchaser of the patent at the determined price.
33 Providing more 
scope for compulsory licenses by making it easier for countries to issue them is another complementary 
way to reduce some of the inefficiencies associated with the current patent system, and ensure more 
affordable access to patented green innovations by poorer households in low-income countries.
34  
In a patent pool, a group of patent holders agree to license a combined set of patents to one another (a 
closed  pool)  or  to  any  party  (an  open  pool).  Patent  pools  have  been  proposed  as  a  solution  for 
inefficiencies that arise in the patent system when too many related fragments of patents are necessary to 
develop future  inventions.
35 As an illustration of a concrete initiative on this front in the context of 
developing country needs, the international drug-purchasing facility UNITAID agreed to provide funding 
for a Medicines Patent Pool, which was then established as a Swiss foundation in July 2010 to focus on 
increasing access to HIV medicines in developing countries. It provides a ‗one-stop shop‘ voluntary 
licensing service that pools multiple patents and licenses them, with patent holders getting royalties on the 
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Brazil, China, India and Mexico. 
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34 Henry and Stiglitz (2010) document h ow the US used the threat of a compulsory license to manufacture Cipro 
during the anthrax scare following 9/11, and how it overrode patent rights and forced the formation of patent pools 
to further develop the airplane during WWII, concluding that ―what the war against Germany or Japan required, the 
war against climate change might as well‖ (p. 245). Canada used compulsory licenses mainly for dealing with health 
requirements. 
35 See Shapiro (2000) for a discussion on the efficiency-increasing properties of patent pools. Empirical evidence on 
this issue is provided by Lerner et al (2003), who found that patents were cited more often after being included in a 
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sales of adapted more affordable generic medicines, and generic manufacturers getting access to broader 
markets.
36 A similar approach could be used for neglected seeds for drought -prone, saline environments, 
or for other patented green solutions for lower-income countries. 
 
Generally broader in scope than a patent pool, patent commons allow technology holders to pledge their 
patents  for  widespread  use  for  no  royalty  payment.  In  January  2008,  the  not-for-profit  Eco-Patent 
Commons  initiative  was created  by  a few  large  MNC  patent  holders  in  cooperation  with  the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development. As of mid-2011, over 100 patents have been pledged by 
13 participating MNCs, with all pledged patents automatically licensed royalty-free provided they are 
used in a product or process that produces some environmental benefit. Based on a recent analysis by Hall 
and Helmers (2011), pledged patents do appear to be climate-change related, though more in the form of 
environmental clean-up or clean manufacturing. However, evidence to-date suggests that there has been 
no discernible impact on the diffusion of the knowledge embedded in the protected technologies to other 
patenting firms. A related development on this front is open source innovation, where a body of original 
information or technology platform is made publicly available for others to use and adapt. The Open 
Source  Drug  Discovery  (OSDD)  initiative  launched  by  India‘s  Council  of  Scientific  and  Industrial 
Research (CSIR) in September 2008 is one such platform. OSDD is a public-private partnership between 
industry and academia in open source mode, with the purpose of hastening the discovery of drugs for 
neglected diseases through collaborative exchange of information. Again, a similar approach could be 
used for neglected green innovation needs for lower-income countries. Box 8 highlights a multilateral 
mechanism for broader dissemination of biodiversity. 
 
Box 8. Access and Benefit-Sharing and the Nagoya Protocol 
Genetic resources (from plants, animals, or micro-organisms) are used in a wide range of activities, either 
for  basic  research  or  for  product  development.  Moreover,  the  traditional  knowledge  associated  with  them  and 
coming  from  indigenous  and  local  communities  provides  valuable  information  for  their  potential  future  use  in 
medicines or cosmetics, among others. The ―fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of 
genetic  resources‖  or  Access  and  Benefit-Sharing  (ABS)  is  one  of  the  three  overarching  objectives  of  the 
Convention on Biological Biodiversity (CBD), together with the conservation of biodiversity and the sustainable use 
of its components. However, a lot of uncertainty has always remained as to the practical implementation of ABS. 
The Nagoya Protocol (NP) on Access and Benefit-Sharing is an international treaty which aims to develop 
greater legal certainty as well as transparency for providers and users of genetic resources. The NP covers the use of 
genetic resources (covered by the CBD) and the traditional knowledge which is associated with it. Its objective is for 
both  parties  to  acknowledge  and  respect  their  reciprocal  obligations.  Hence,  the  biodiversity-rich  party  must 
facilitate access to its resources on the one hand (through the establishment of clear rules and procedures, the 
issuance  of  permits  when  access  is  granted,  etc.)  and  reciprocally,  the  user  of  genetic  resource  must  commit 
contractually to ensure an equitable sharing of the benefits accruing from the utilization of this resource, as well as 
its subsequent utilization. Examples of benefit-sharing include: payment of royalties, preferential access for the 
provider country to any medicine deriving from the genetic resources (and associated traditional knowledge), joint 
ownership of intellectual property rights, collaborative research, etc. 
Source: http://www.cbd.int/abs/about/ 
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3.2.2 Stimulate absorption of green technologies 
Absent environmental social costs being fully reflected in market prices, demand-side innovation policies 
including  public  procurement,  regulations  and  standards, together with effective enforcement, are 
typically needed to stimulate both creation and diffusion of green technologies. They include guaranteed 
feed-in tariffs for renewables, taxes and tradable permits for emissions pollution, tax credits and rebates 
for consumers of new technologies (e.g. for compact fluorescent light bulbs), comparison labeling (to 
inform  consumers  about  the  relative  efficiency  of  products),  endorsement  labeling  (e.g.  ‗CFC-free‘), 
government rules (e.g. limits to polluting emissions from industrial plants), and industry-driven standards 
(e.g. home and office building insulation). Because they can be such an important pre-condition to the 
diffusion and absorption of green technologies in developing countries, they are treated in this section. In 
contrast to most technologies which are adopted because they are inherently cost-reducing or revenue-
enhancing to firms, green technologies are often more costly to adopt by firms and not immediately more 
attractive  to  end-use  customers.  Hence  these  demand-side  policies  are  needed  to  provide  a  critical 
incentive to trigger their adoption. Inventors will not develop and firms will not adopt technologies for 
which there is insufficient demand. Box 9 provides an illustration of a standard for very low energy 
building standards in the Czech Republic, with 90 percent energy savings for required combined heating 
and cooling after reconstruction according to the standards. 
Box 9. Energy savings through low energy (passive house) building standards 
The concept of passive solar building design dates back  to antiquity, reducing a building‘s ecological 
footprint. According to the Czech low energy voluntary building standard, and in line with similar standards adopted 
in  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany  and  the  UK  (with  Luxembourg,  Romania,  Slovak 
Republic and Sweden planning to adopt similar standards), the ‗passive house‘ standard requires that the building be 
designed to have an annual combined heating and cooling demand of not more than 15 kWh per square meter per 
year. Passive house technologies typically include solar heating to heat and lighten the space naturally, super glazing 
of windows and an airtight building envelope, without a need for a conventional heating or cooling system; the air is 
fresh and very clean, and the inside temperature is homogeneous. As of August 2010, there were approximately 
25,000  such  certified  structures  of  all  types  in  Europe,  including  residential    and  office  buildings,  schools, 
kindergartens  and  supermarkets,  applying  to  new  buildings  and  refurbishments.  The  illustrated  refurbished 
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  Publicly-funded pilot demonstration projects, instrumental in proving technical and economic feasibility so that 
the private market could then develop; the role of the public sector as early adopter was also crucial. 
  Certification/labeling of low energy buildings and trained professionals, to promote confidence of consumers, 
control costs, and promote the uptake of low-energy buildings.  
  The CEPH (Certified European Passive House Designer) project, a pilot training course for certified house 
designers, already implemented in nine EU countries: architects, construction engineers and building designers 
received a ―train the trainers‖ course and certificate, in order to then help train all operators in the construction 
chain, from academia and R&D to builders, contractors, real estate agents, and homeowners. 
Several  EU  countries  have  already  set  up  long-term  strategies  and  targets  for  achieving  low-energy 
standards for all new houses:  
  in the Netherlands, there is a voluntary agreement with industry to have energy neutral buildings by 2020 
  in the UK, the ambition is to have zero carbon homes by 2016 
  in France all new buildings should be energy-positive (produce energy) by 2020 
  in Germany, soft interest-free loans during the first years up to Euro 75,000 are available both for renovations 
and new constructions 
Source: EU (2009), Barta (2006). 
Improving a country‘s financial infrastructure also can have significant effects on green growth by, 
among others, providing funding for adopting green infrastructure, and enabling farmers to adopt higher-
return technologies that both decrease crop losses and decrease vulnerability to the losses (Box 10). Barry 
et al. (2011) examine the adoption of efficient stoves, biogas plants and tobacco barns by commercial 
farmers  in  Malawi,  Rwanda  and  Tanzania;  financing  was  cited  as  the  main  stumbling  block  for  all 
projects  because  of  high  start-up  costs.  Brunschweiler  (2010)  finds  across  a  range  of  low-income 
countries that an increase in financial intermediation has a significant effect on non-hydro renewable 
energy generation per capita, because investment in renewable energy is constrained in environments 
where access to long-term loans is limited. And D‘Agostino et al. (2011) find that access to financial 
credit  is  an  important  barrier to solar home  systems  adoption in  China.
37 Echoing this theme of the 
important  supporting  role  of  bank  financing,  Wolf  ( 2011)  explains  how  the  largely  bank -based, 
relationship-based financial systems played a key role in supporting the lower-risk technology absorption 
by firms during the reconstruction of continental Europe after World War II and in the subsequent years 
when income convergence was the main challenge. 
Box 10. Micro-insurance for drought adaptation by subsistence farmers in Malawi 
  Improving  financial  insurance  instruments  by  bundling  index-based  drought  insurance  with  credit  has 
enabled farmers to adopt higher-return technologies, contributing both to climate-change adaptation (reducing crop 
losses from more frequent drought-flood spells) and to decreasing vulnerability to climate-change impacts. 
  Malawi farmers face food security threats from their high exposure to weather risk, with about 80% of the 
population  depending  on  rain-fed  subsistence  agriculture.  A  critical  obstacle  to  adopting  better  technologies  is 
poorly-functioning financial services markets – with banks unable to manage covariant drought and other risks that 
affect whole regions at the same time. Lack of affordable credit by smallholder farms has prevented access to more 
expensive, higher-yield seeds. 
  In contrast to traditional crop insurance, index-based insurance makes pre-specified payouts contingent not 
on the loss itself but on a physical trigger linked to the event causing the loss, such as rainfall measured at a local 
weather station. Advantages include: (i) lower administration costs for payouts and less scope for corruption (as 
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payments are triggered by recorded weather data rather than expensive claims-handling of crop damage in multiple 
small farms); (ii) no moral hazard (as payouts are independent of farmers‘ practices); (iii) no adverse selection or 
over-representation of high-risk insured in the pool (as there is a balance of information about the weather on part of 
insurer and insured). A pilot scheme during the 2005-06 season that bundled bank loans with the insurance (so that 
farmers could pay for both the premium and high-yield seeds) demonstrated that the scheme could operate without 
ongoing subsidies (after the mechanism was set in place and start-up expenses were covered by the government). 
The scheme decreased crop losses by offering incentives to change cultivation practices to become more resistant to 
drought. And it decreased vulnerability by increasing productivity in good seasons: with a doubling of their cash 
crop in good seasons, famers were able to save, both raising and smoothing their income over time. 
  The experience highlights the importance of absorptive capacity at the individual level. A survey revealed 
that only 55% of farmers reported understanding the scheme before joining it, highlighting the need to substantially 
improve communication and education. The survey also revealed a lack of trust among farmers in the weather 
station measurements, highlighting the importance of institutional trust as a challenge in scaling up operations. 
Source: Kunreuther and Michel-Kerman (2011) and Suarez and Linnerooth-Bayer (2010). 
 
Finally, three issues are particularly relevant for developing countries. First, as global green technologies 
improve, the falling costs of adoption relative to existing non-green technologies facilitate their adoption 
by firms. They also lower the costs of adopting the relevant environmental regulation by governments. In 
their study of the adoption of regulations limiting emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOX) and sulfur dioxide 
(SO2) at coal-fired plants across 39 developed and developing countries, Lovely and Popp (2011) show 
that countries adopting these regulations at later dates do so at lower levels of per capita income than 
adopters who enacted similar regulations earlier. The availability of the technology at lower cost should 
help shape the regulation that is required as incentive for firms in lower income countries to adopt it. 
The second issue concerns the potential longer-run benefit of well-designed environmental regulation 
in enhancing innovation and competitiveness, and the extent to which benefits may more than fully offset 
the cost of the regulation.
38 Especially in less mature markets characterized by inadequate physical and 
institutional business infrastructure prevalent in many developing countries, firms may miss profitable 
green investment opportunities because they are too risky, too costly for the manager, or out of the 
manager‘s  habits,  routines  and  technical  expertise.  By  making  these  investments  more  profitable  or 
requiring them, environmental regulations can help the manager overcome these problems. In line with 
this view, Alpay et al. (2002) estimate the productivity of the Mexican food-processing industry to be 
increasing with the pressure of environmental regulation. And in a sample of 17 Quebec manufacturing 
sectors,  Lanoie  et  al.  (2008)  have  found  that  stricter  regulations  led  to  modest  long-term  gains  in 
productivity – first reducing productivity in year one, having a slightly positive effect in year two, and 
then resulting in more positive outcomes in years three and four, more than offsetting the first year‘s loss. 
Most empirical studies of the impact of well-designed environmental regulations in high-income countries 
have found that they stimulate innovation by firms as measured by R&D spending or patents. However, 
there is relatively little overall evidence to-date that the induced innovation is sufficient to overcome the 
added costs of regulation, with 10 of 13 studies surveyed by Ambec et al. (2011) finding that the net 
effect  of  environment  regulation  on  productivity  or  profitability  is  negative.  In  terms  of  design  of 
                                                           
38 This view has come to be known as the Porter hypothesis, based on an initial statement that strict environmental 
regulations do not inevitably hinder competitive advantage against rivals but can often enhance it, at least in the long 
run (Porter 1991), and a subsequent set of case studies (Porter and van der Linde 1995). See Ambec et al. (2011) for 
a review of the literature. 30 
 
environmental regulations, the literature emphasizes that policies should strive to be win-win compatible, 
in particular focusing on end results rather than means, and be stable and predictable. 
A third issue concerns the use of emerging international sustainability  standards for products and 
processes as an instrument in helping local firms upgrade their environmental practices, a form of catch-
up innovation for business practices.
39 The linking of local firms to the global value chains of MNCs that 
have adopted sustainability standards helps leverage international market pressures for environmental 
improvement. Box 11 provides an illustration of how the South African deep-sea hake industry was able 
to anchor more sustainable local fishing practices through its association with an intern ational standards 
organization. 
 
Box 11. South African deep-sea fishing 
  A highly visible and credible product certification that deep-sea hake fishing was sustainably managed by 
the international non-governmental standards organization, the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), constrained 
local regulators in South Africa from allowing excessive entry of fishermen (which would have depleted stocks). It  
led to restructuring of the equity structures of existing companies to meet Black Economic Empowerment goals. 
  Other related examples of international sustainability standards include the Forest Stewardship Council (a 
joint initiative of firms and NGOs with principles for sustainable forestry to which participating firms must adhere, 
with accredited private auditing agencies to monitor and certify firms‘ compliance, and compliant firms using the 
FSC seal to differentiate their products to create a price premium), the Fairtrade Labeling Organizations Alliance 
(FLO), and the Rainforest Alliance. These four alliances and few others formed the ISEAL Alliance in 2002 as the 
global association for social and environmental standards, supported by certification and compliance mechanisms. 
Source: Levy et al. (2011) and Levy (2011). 
 
 
3.2.3 The relative effectiveness of supply-push versus demand-pull policies 
As suggested in Figure 1, different mixes of policy instruments are likely to be effective for countries at 
different stages of technological sophistication. Some recent empirical evidence suggests that a greater 
emphasis on targeted supply-push government R&D funding, when local technological capabilities are in 
place,  is  more  effective  than  demand-pull  policies
40 at generating  radical,  new-to-the-world  frontier 
innovations. This evidence is based on patent applications filed worldwide from 1994 to 2005 in wind 
power technology: the marginal million dollars spent on public support to R&D (mostly tax credits on  
private R&D expenditures received by companies once expenditures have been incurred) generated 0.82 
new inventions whereas the same amount spent on demand -pull policies induced  at best 0.06 new 
inventions (Dechezlepretre  and Glachant, 2011). A separate ca se study to assess the extent to which 
                                                           
39 The Cement Sustainability Initiative, initially created in 2002 by ten of the largest cement manufacturers, has 
expanded to include 23 major cement producers operating in more than 100 countries. The CSI, among others, 
identifies actions and facilitates steps for cement companies to accelerate progress towards sustainable development 
(such as lower GHG-emitting and more energy-efficient processes), and foster greater stakeholder involvement. CSI 
includes developing country companies such as Argos (Colombia), CEMEX (Mexico), Cimentos Liz, InterCement 
and Votorantim (Brazil), China Resources Cement Holdings Ltd, CNBM, Sinoma, Tianrui Group and Yatai Group 
(China), Shree Cement and Ultratech Cement (India), and Siam Cement Group (Thailand). 
40 Namely, deployment polici es such as guaranteed  feed-in  tariffs, production tax credits,  and  obligations on 
electricity supply companies to produce a specified fraction of their power from renewable energy sources. 31 
 
demand-pull policies stimulated non-incremental (radical) change in the California wind power industry 
in the 1975-1991 period also finds no evidence that demand-side policies alone encouraged more radical 
frontier-type technical change (Nemet, 2009). 
Figure 9. Motivation of firms introducing environmental innovations, 2006-08 
(Firms citing factors as motivations, percentage of innovative firms) 
 
Source: OECD, based on Eurostat (CIS-2008) and national data sources, June 2011. 
Note: The Community Innovation Survey (CIS-2008) was the first to introduce a voluntary module on 
environmental innovation. An ‗environmental innovation‘ is defined as an innovation that leads to 
more  environmental  benefits  than  alternatives.  The  environmental  benefits  can  be  the  primary 
objective or the result of other innovation objectives. ‗Innovative firms‘ refers to firms with any of the 
four types of innovation (product, process, organizational and marketing). 
 
   
However, for technologies that are more mature, a greater emphasis on demand-side policies may be 
more effective in spurring firms to introduce more incremental innovations. Based on firm responses in 
16 countries as part of the 2008 EU Community Innovation Surveys, Figure 9 shows that existing or 
future environmental regulations, followed by market demand from customers, are identified by firms in 
most countries as the main driver of introducing environmental innovations. The availability of direct 
public support in the form of fiscal incentives is the least important reported motivation in all countries. 
Figure  10  highlights  the  reported  benefits  of  environmental  innovations  (from  the  same  survey). 
Interestingly, in most countries surveyed (15 of 19 for this question), a larger percentage of innovative 
firms perceive the environmental benefits of innovation to be on the cost side (in terms of reduced energy 
use per unit of output) than on the revenue side (in terms of customers being willing to pay more for new 
products that reduce energy usage by end-users). This suggests that most of these innovations are likely to 
be incremental process rather than more radical product innovations. 

























Thus, it appears that a greater emphasis on supply-side policies may be more effective in stimulating 
more radical frontier innovation when local capabilities are in place, a greater emphasis on demand-side 
policies may be more effective in spurring firms to introduce incremental environmental innovations 
(both  frontier  and  catch-up).  The  available  evidence  does  not  contradict  a  judicious  combination  of 
supply-side and demand-side policies, appropriate to the local context. 
Figure 10. Benefits of environmental innovations, 2006-08 
(As a percentage of innovative firms) 
 
Source: OECD, based on Eurostat (CIS-2008) and national data sources, June 2011. 
 
3.3 Developing absorptive capacity 
At  the  level  of  the  firm,  the  ability  to  ‗learn‘  is  seen  as  essential  for  innovation.  Firm  learning  or 
‗absorptive capacity‘ refers to a firm‘s ability to understand, adapt and use technologies. According to 
Cohen and Levinthal (1989), a firm‘s learning capacity is enhanced by its R&D activities, so that R&D 
has important roles in both frontier and catch-up innovation.  
Griffith, Redding, and Van Reenen (2004) find empirical support in a panel of industries across 12 OECD 
countries for these ―two faces of R&D‖, this notion that R&D, in addition to stimulating the generation of 
new  frontier  technologies,  also  improves  the  firm‘s  ability  to  globally  search  for  and  adapt  existing 
technologies,  and  allows  firms  to  more  easily  understand  and  assimilate  the  discoveries  of  others. 
Interestingly, they find that countries further from the technological frontier have higher rates of return to 
R&D than those at the frontier, due to the enhanced learning that R&D facilitates.
41 If returns to R&D rise 
for countries further from the frontier, then  why don‘t low-income developing countries that are further 
from the frontier than the OECD countries in the study invest even more in R&D? One explanation of 
why returns to R&D don‘t keep rising in developing countries, and in fact fall significantly below those 
of the frontier countries, is that the business environment worsens typically as countries get further from 
the  frontier,  so  that  the  general  accumulation  of  all  assets  (including  intangible  knowledge  assets) 
worsens. Faced with worse incentives for productive entrepreneurship, even the best ideas yield lower 
                                                           
41 While the US, typically at the technological frontier, had a rate of return to R&D of 57% with R&D‘s contribution 
to TFP growth largely due to innovation, Finland had a rate of return of 105% with less than half the estimated 
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returns – if they are allowed to come to fruition at all. Moreover, progressively weaker human capital in 
both public and private sectors may result in lower returns (fewer good ideas) from a given amount of 
R&D investment (Goni, Lederman and Maloney, 2011). The section begins by examining the need for 
strengthening skills to address this key constraint to the accumulation of knowledge, and then discusses a 
few policies to address the more general business environment constraints impeding experimentation, 
global learning, and talent attraction and retention. 
3.3.1 Strengthen education and skills for green innovation 
Figure 11. Number of Researchers  
A.  Researchers by R&D performing sector, 2009 
(Per thousand total employment in the economy) 
B.  % Researchers who are Female 
 
 
Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators Database, June 2011. 
 











































































Green innovation, like innovation in general, depends on people who are able to generate and apply 
knowledge in the workplace and society at large. Required innovation skills include basic skills such as 
reading and writing, technical skills such as science and engineering, generic skills such as problem 
solving, multicultural openness and leadership, managerial and entrepreneurial skills, as well as creativity 
and design skills. It has been recently proposed that the green economy requires a greater emphasis on 
design  and  multidisciplinary  teamwork,  on  strategic  leadership  and  adaptability  as  important  generic 
skills, and on a good knowledge of the sciences (OECD 2011e and CEDEFOP 2009). 
Figure 11 highlights how far behind most advanced developing countries are from the more developed 
countries, based on the relative number of professionals engaged in the creation of knowledge and in the 
management  of  research  projects.  While  the  five  surveyed  high-income  Nordic  countries  (Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden), Japan, Korea and New Zealand each employed more than ten 
researchers per 1,000 employees, advanced developing countries are at the bottom of the table, with 
China, South Africa, Chile and Mexico each having less than two researchers per 1,000 employees. It is 
noteworthy, however, that the 10 developing countries included in these data  have a higher average 
percentage of women researchers (37%) than the 22 high-income countries (31%). 
Across countries, the share of business researchers in the national totals varies widely: while in the US 
four out of five researchers work in businesses, the intensity of business researchers is again lowest in 
emerging developing countries, with Chile, Mexico, South Africa, Poland, the Slovak Republic, China 
and Turkey all having less than one researcher per 1,000 employees in industry. In these countries, the 
business sector plays a much smaller role in the national R&D system than the higher education and 
government sectors, which is a characteristic of most other developing countries as well. If developing 
country firms are going to effectively play a greater role in accessing existing green technologies and 
adapting them for local use, they will need more individuals with research and related creativity skills in 
the workforce.
42 So a major effort will be required to strengthen market signals so that tertiary education 
institutions and technical and vocational education and training (TVET) systems are better attuned to the 
demands of firms and what users need, including through increased involvement of the business sector in 
curriculum development. Ensuring that skills upgrading costs are shared among students, employers and 
the  government  in  line   with  benefits,  and adopting  periodic  national independent and  transparent 
assessments  to  ensure  quality  and  consistency,  will  help  to  signal  the  merits  of  different  skills 
development options and promote adaptation in line with evolving market demands  (OECD 2009). Box 
12 provides an illustration of the challenges of building relevant skills in developing country settings . It 
highlights the need to have sufficient local capabilities in place to attract back home scientists trained in 
better-equipped high-income country universities, and the need to ensure sufficient local demand for 
established scientific and research facilities. 
Box 12: African Monsoon Multidisciplinary Analyses (AMMA) 
The West Africa region is particularly vulnerable to weather and climate variability due to dependence on 
rain-fed agriculture on which 80% of Sahel‘s population depends 
To achieve its objective of monitoring West African monsoon variability and society-environment-climate 
impacts, the  AMMA community (an international community established in 2002 of over 600 people from 30 
                                                           
42 An important unresolved issue here is the extent to which skills are substitutable between green and non-green 
technologies, as there is an opportunity cost of investing in the skills sets and training for green to the extent that 
non-green innovations do not occur as a result of skewing capacity building towards greener technologies. 35 
 
countries, including 250 in Africa with 80 African PhD students, funded by agencies from Africa, the EU, France, 
UK and US) established local university research programs in climatology, agronomy and related social science 
fields, and built functional and research teams that built new capacity for improved early-warning systems. These 
research  teams  and  university  programs  will  in  turn  continue  to  train  cohorts  of  African  specialists,  thereby 
cultivating a community whose mutual interest in AMMA-related issues will help ensure sustainability. 
Although AMMA has been relatively successful in building an international community in partnership with 
Africans  in  its  first  phase  (2002-10),  the  main  challenge  moving  forward  in  its  second  phase  (2010-20)  is  to 
stimulate and ensure sufficient two-way conversations between what users need and what science is capable of 
doing, in particular generating sufficient downstream demand for improved forecasting and early-warning systems 
in terms of pull-through of knowledge by users making decisions on the ground: by farmers in terms of when to 
plan, by hydropower and flood managers in terms of operation of dams, by healthcare side in terms of diseases 
driven by dust (meningitis) and mosquitoes (malaria, etc.) – in this way, with stronger downstream user demand, the 
support by politicians for required scientific resources would be more likely. 
Source: Thorncroft (2011). 
 
3.3.2 Develop broader absorptive capacities 
Three policy areas are discussed here that may be particularly important in most developing countries in 
affecting the ability of entrepreneurs and firms to learn, namely how the prevailing business environment 
can facilitate experimentation and quick market re-entry following failure, facilitate collaborative learning 
by workers and firms from leading global firms, and help attract and retain talent. 
Policies  to  overcome  the  stigma  of  failure  and  encourage  opportunities  for  re-entry  and  renewed 
experimentation seem to be important drivers of innovation. The US approach to corporate bankruptcy 
puts economic resources back to productive use as quickly as possible, either saving viable companies 
from premature liquidation or putting pressure on courts to restructure assets quickly.
43 While closing a 
terminally ill business takes less than 10 months and allows over 90 cents on the dollar to be recovered in 
Canada or Singapore, it still takes on average 7 years in Mumbai to recover roughly 16 cents on the dollar 
(World Bank 2011). Although difficult legal reforms and changes in attitude to debt are involved, making 
it easier to wind up businesses is one of the best ways to get more people to try out new ideas and start 
them. In addition, it would probably also be helpful to make existing innovative role models more widely 
known, such as India‘s Tata group awarding an annual prize for the best failed idea.
44 So would policies 
that reduce the level of sunk costs required to try out a commercializable idea in the first place . This 
includes improving the depth of resale markets, so that fixed assets such as the machines in a production 
line that didn‘t work out can be quickly and easily resold. And removing impediments for electricity and 
IT-serviced  business  premises  to  be  easily  leased  or  rented  rather  than  requiring  more  significant 
investments in own assets while the market size for a product is not yet known. 
Facilitating global connectivity  of people through  global alliances and insertion of firms into global 
value chains also is critical for enhanced learning. In both China and India‘s rapid development of wind 
energy capabilities, while licensing agreements with European manufacturers to gain initial access to 
turbine technology were important, international mobility of workers was as important if not more so: 
Suzlon,  the  top  Indian  wind  turbine  manufacturer,  established  R&D  facilities  in  Germany  and  the 
                                                           
43 Chrysler and GM were in hands of changed owners in 45 days of filing for bankruptcy. 
44 See the Schumpeter column in The Economist (April 14, 2011). 36 
 
Netherlands  to  have  its  workers  learn  from  global  expertise,  while  Goldwind,  the  top  Chinese 
manufacturer, sent workers abroad for training.
45 Fibrovent Wind, a Chilean wind turbine blade start -up 
that was created by inserting itself into a Spanish global value chain, also benefited from international 
mobility of skilled workers: in  addition to  South-South transfer of equipment knowledge, there was 
transfer of management knowledge when a Brazilian wind turbine expert  was hired to help set up the 
company. There was also  knowledge  transfer about composite materials from the Chilean mining 
industry, highlighting the impo rtance of local absorptive capacity in effective technology transfer.
46 
Learning networks also appear to have been critical in the development of China‘s photovoltaic (PV) 
industry: of the top 9 PV producers, only three received FDI while all firms exchanged knowledge with 
equipment suppliers and benefited from training sessions of engineers and technicians.
47 Finally, a recent 
public-private  partnership  program  —that  uses  large  MNC  ‗anchor‘  companies  to  solicit  SME 
participation  and  provides  education  to  increase  productivity,  competitiveness  and  environmental 
performance—  appears to  offer  a promising  model  for  diffusing  eco-efficiency  techniques to  SMEs: 
during the 2005-07 pilot phase of Mexico‘s Green Supply Chains Program, 14 MNCs with operations in 
Mexico participated together with 146 SMEs, with the average SME participant generating environmental 
improvements of reduced water and electricity usage, carbon dioxide emissions and waste disposal, as 
well as sizeable economic savings, together with improved supply chain relationships.
48 The impressive 
results suggest the presence of win-win opportunities for eco-efficiency projects to both save money and 
reduce environmental damages, no doubt driven by unexploited benefits from improved information 
dissemination, mentoring and learning. 
A final policy area ripe for joint national and local policy reforms in coordination with the private sector 
is the urban dimension of entrepreneurship development, namely enhancement of the livability and 
―stickiness‖ of cities, to attract and retain talent.
49 The shift in population as workers move from rural 
agriculture to urban areas that facilitate face -to-face learning and creative interactions between young 
entrepreneurs, skilled people, and institutions connected to global  knowledge should help unleash 
innovation  (Glaeser,  2011).  Dense  urban -industrial  cluster  agglomerations  have  been  vital  for 
                                                           
45 See Popp (2011), who highlights the work of Lewis (2007) documenting how China and India went from no wind 
turbine manufacturing capacity to almost-complete local production in less than 10 years. Sauter and Watson (2008) 
present  this  as  a  case  study  of  ‗environmental  leapfrogging‘,  highlighting  how  the  adoption  of  cutting-edge 
technologies was facilitated by the creation of learning networks. 
46 See Popp (2011) and the underlying  the analysis of technology transfer in the development of the Chilean wind 
industry in Pueyo et al. (2011). 
47 See Popp (2011) who highlights international mobility of workers as a more important source of information than 
FDI or licensing, and de la Tour et al. (2011) for the underlying analysis. 
48 The initiative was led by the NAFTA-established Commission for Environmental Cooperation, and included the 
environmental authority of the state of Queretaro and the Global Environmental Management Initiative non -profit 
organization  of  leading  US  MNCs  focused  on  environmental  sustainability.  It  is  a  10 -week  eco-efficiency 
educational training program emphasizing learning-by-doing with a commitment by participating SMEs to generate 
and  implement  pollution -prevention  projects,  with  recommendations  for  change  made  by  the  participants 
themselves. Investments related to the implementation of the improvement projects were provided by the individual 
SMEs, who became convinced of their value. Lyon and van Hoo f (2010) found that the average SME participant 
generated a project with NPV of over $150,000, saved 1,900 cubic me ters of water each year, saved 42,000 
Kwh/year of electricity, reduced carbon dioxide emissions by 61 tons/year and cut waste disposal by 1,455 tons. 
49 International experience suggests that much of the absorption of existing frontier technologies and the nurturing of 
technological advances are likely to be concentrated in a few metropolitan regions. Half of the productivity growth 
recorded by the US between 2000 and 2008 was by 20 metropolitan areas, with these cities accounting for 40% of 
GDP (McKinsey 2011). 37 
 
technological upgrading and productivity growth by opening opportunities and stimulating supplies of 
capital and skills. China‘s establishment of special economic zones, followed by a range of support by 
national  and  local  governments  for  further  industrial  deepening  in  its  three  major  urban/industrial 
agglomerations (the Pearl River Delta centered on Shenzhen, Dongguan and Foshan, the Yangtze River 
region around the Shanghai-Suzhou axis, and the Bohai region in the vicinity of Beijing and Tianjin) and 
in a number of inland cities (including the footwear cluster in Chengdu and the Wuhan opto-electronics 
cluster) highlights how a mix of instruments can be employed together, including support to science parks 
and extension services, encouragement of local universities to deepen industrial linkages, attracting a 
major local or foreign anchor firm that can trigger the in-migration of suppliers and imitators, and above 
all dense transport and communication connectivity infrastructure (Yusuf, Nabeshima and Yamashita 
2008). 
4   OUTSTANDING ISSUES 
Looking forward, there remains an important policy research agenda to better understand both evolving 
patterns of green innovation and the relative effectiveness of appropriate mixes of policies in different 
technological and institutional contexts.  
Regarding patterns of green innovation, there is need for better data collection on green innovation. In 
particular, there is no direct evidence on adoption and adaptation of green technologies. There are almost 
no data measuring BoP green innovations to meet the needs of poor consumers. Firm-level surveys could 
be a good source to better understand what is taking place on the ground, with the recent EU Community 
Innovation green module a good starting point for more systematic inquiry across developing countries. 
More generally, it would be useful to better monitor public and private inputs being devoted to green 
innovation, starting with a more detailed breakdown of green R&D expenditures (as in Frischtak (2011) 
for Brazil), and then going beyond R&D investments to measure the broader range of green investments 
in intangible capital, including other expenditures on innovative property (such as green architectural and 
engineering  designs),  on  green-related  software  and  databases,  and  on  green-related  economic 
competencies (such as branding, employee training, and organizational improvements).
50 
Regarding policy, almost all evidence on the impact of policies to -date is from  high-income countries. 
And even for high-income countries, the evidence on green innovation policy impact is scant. Not only is 
there not a lot of good data on angel investing  in high-income countries, but there are no  cost benefit 
analyses on angel ta x  credits  or other policies to promote angel investors. Nor is there an impact 
evaluation study on  what Chinese banks  have been  doing to support their green energy producers . 
Unfortunately, very few policies have been analyzed to figure out where the bang for the buck is. So there 
is an urgent need for well-designed impact evaluations of specific policy interventions. Both experimental 
evaluation with randomized controlled trials and quasi-experimental evaluation of existing interventions 
are needed, particularly regarding the effectiveness of different policies to promote firm-level absorption 
of existing green technologies.
 51   
                                                           
50 See Dutz et al. (2011) for an application of measuring intangible capital to Brazil. 
51 An impact evaluation (IE) of a program or policy seeks to quantitatively measure the impact of the program on 
specific outcomes of interest, and is distinct from monitoring or evaluation of program activities. Since beneficiary 
outcomes are affected by a host of factors (besides th e program being evaluated), identification of the causal link 
between program and outcomes is the key challenge for IE. IE tackles this problem by comparing program 
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DATA ANNEX 
i.  „Green‟ Patenting 
 
We use the PATSTAT database to measure patents granted by the US (USPTO) in ‗green‘ technology 
areas. The technology area of a patent can be identified using the International Patent Classification (IPC) 
codes. We identify green patents  using an exhaustive list of IPC codes pertaining to climate change 
mitigation technologies which was developed by Dechezleprêtre et al. (2011) and is used by the OECD. A 
patent in the PATSTAT database is categorized as green if any of its associated IPC codes belongs to this 
list. The first -named inventor‘s country of residence is used to assign a patent to a country. 
The 13 different classes of technologies with significant global GHG emission abatement potential that 
are used for our patent analysis include: 
7 renewable energy technologies 
  biomass: solid fuels from animals or plants, and engines operating on such fuels 
  geothermal: devices for producing mechanical power from geo energy 
  hydropower: hydraulic turbines, devices for control, hydro power stations 
  ocean or marine energy: wave power plants, water wheels, ocean thermal energy conversion 
  solar: solar panels, heat collectors, use for heating and cooling 
  waste-to-energy: solid fuels, recovery of heat from waste and exhaust gases 
  wind: motors and devices to control motors 
plus 6 additional technologies 
  buildings: heating (heat pumps, air conditioning) and thermal insulation in buildings 
  carbon (Carbon Capture and Sequestration): extraction, storage and sequestration of CO2 
  cement: climate-friendly cements, including pozzolana, iron ore, calcium sulfate 
  fuel injection (electric and hybrid vehicles): also including batteries, control systems 
  lighting: energy-efficient compact fluorescent lamps, electroluminescent light sources (LED) 
  methane destruction: anaerobic and biological treatment of waste, collection of fermentation gases 
These technologies represent nearly 50% of all GHG abatement opportunities beyond business-as-usual 
until 2010, excluding forestry, identified by Enkvist et al. (2007). 
 
We look at patent grants rather than applications. Grants are a more conservative measure and a better 
indicator of innovations closer to being commercialized and having passed through a more thorough 
review.  
Our use of US patents, as opposed to those granted by the respective national patent offices, is based 
largely on comparability concerns, a problem particularly acute in developing countries. The US is also 
the world‘s largest unified consumer market, and therefore has a tendency to attract the highest quality 
patents;  and  although  market-pull  type  green  innovation  policy  actions  have  been  inadequate  at  the 
federal level, there are many instances of such policy action at state and local levels that have created 
vibrant regional markets for green innovations. Moreover, data on home patenting are not easily available 
for some developing countries.  
A significant drawback of US patent counts is that not all inventions made in other countries are patented 
in the US. In particular, US patent counts will under-represent inventions that are local to the inventor‘s 44 
 
country and not intended to be sold elsewhere. Water pollution control technologies, for instance, are less 
likely to be patented abroad, as local conditions shape the requirements of these technologies (Popp 
2011). More generally, since patents are not the only tool available to inventors to protect their invention, 
patent  counts  are  likely  to  under-measure  inventions.  However,  there  are  very  few  examples  of 
economically significant inventions which have not been patented (Dernis et al. 2001), and patent counts 
are positively correlated with total inventions. Thus, analysis of US patent counts gives a good sense of 
broad  patterns  and  trends.  Since  patents  granted  to  US  nationals  (that  is,  home  patenting)  are  not 
comparable to those granted to other nationals, we analyzed trends for high income countries with and 
without the US separately. Since these were found to be similar, we present the combined figures. 
ii.  Collaboration 
 
Following Guellec and Potterie (2001), we measure collaboration using data on the inventors‘ country of 
residence in US patent grants. In the estimates given in the text and in Figure 4, the PATSTAT sample of 
USPTO grants is restricted to patents granted to developing countries (or the ‗South‘), namely patents in 
which at least one inventor belongs to a developing country. Among these, a patent is classified as 
indigenous (no cross-country collaboration) if all inventors are from the home country. A patent with 
inventors belonging to more than one developing country but none to developed countries is classified as 
South-South. A patent with one or more inventors from high-income countries in addition to the home 
country is classified as North-South. 
 
iii.  Trade in Green Goods and „Close to Green Goods‟ 
 
To the extent that green technologies are embodied in specific goods and services, green innovation 
would be reflected in product-level output and trade data. In an attempt to improve measurement of this 
‗environmental‘  industry,  the  OECD/Eurostat  Informal  Working  Group  on  the  Environment  Industry 
(OECD 1999) started with the following definition: 
 
The environmental goods and services industry consists of activities which produce goods and services to 
measure, prevent, limit, minimise or correct environmental damage to water, air and soil, as well as 
problems  related  to  waste,  noise  and  eco-systems.  This  includes  cleaner  technologies,  products  and 
services that reduce environmental risk and minimise pollution and resource use. 
 
Note that this definition leads to a broader conceptualization of green goods and services as compared to 
that  for  green  patent  technology  areas,  particularly  in  that  the  latter  considers  only  mitigation 
technologies. 
 
Following this definition, the OECD working group has identified three broad ‗environmental segments‘: 
• pollution management, including goods that control air pollution, manage wastewater and solid waste, 
clean up soil, surface water and groundwater, reduce noise and vibrations, and facilitate environmental 
monitoring 
• cleaner technologies and products, including goods that are  more resource-efficient than available 
alternatives 45 
 
• resource management, including goods to control pollution, supply water, or manage forests/fisheries 
sustainably. 
 
Specific goods and services within these categories have been identified at the 6-digit HS commodity 
classification level. We use this list and the COMTRADE database (at the 6-digit HS level) to measure 
the volume of trade in green goods.  
 
‘Close to Green Goods’: Following Hausmann and Klinger (2007), the proximity between a pair of goods 
is defined as the conditional probability of exporting one given that the other is exported. For instance, the 
proximity  of  Good  A  to  Good  B  is  0.5  if  as  observed  in  international  trade  data,  the  conditional 
probability that a country exports Good A given that it exports Good B is 0.5. For every green 6-digit HS 
category,  we  measure  its  proximity  to  all  other  6-digit  HS  categories  using  COMTRADE  data  on 
international trade, averaged over 2005-08. We classify a product as being ‗close‘ to green if there is 
some green product with a proximity of 0.9 or higher to it. Thus, the probability that a country exports at 
least one green product given that it already exports a close-to-green product is 90 percent or higher. We 
then measure the volume of trade in close to green products using COMTRADE. 